ENDICOTT &, CO. LfTH 54 8!
COPYRIGHT EDITION. THE nf tljc '^.Jutoiniu: ITS ORGANIZATION, ITS COMMANDER, AND ITS CAMPAIGN. V T .' C BY V e. o ’ iao Ph ’ i o6 ’ _t c - ■ THE PRINCE DE JOINVILLE. SransIatrU front ifct FFrcittJi, AV I T II NOTES, G, tA By WILLIAM HENRY HURLBERT. N E AV YORK: ANSON D. F. RANDOLPH, No. 633 B ROADWAY. 1 SG3.
Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1S62, A N S 0 N D. F. It A N I) 0 L J’ II, Id the Clerk's Oflice of the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. KDWAKU i». JENKINS. Pifntrr anD ^Mrolgprr, No 20 Wij.uam St.
The article of which the following pages are a translation appeared in the number of the Revue des Deux Mondes for October 15th, 1862. It is there entitled “ Campagne de l’Armee du Potomac, Mars-Juillet, 1862,” and bears the signature of “A. Trog- non.” It is well understood in Paris that this signature is the om de plume of one of the princes of the House of Orleans, and from the internal evidence afforded by the paper itself I have been led to believe that it was probably written by the Prince de Joinville, who accompanied his nephews, the Comte de Paris and the Duc de Chartres, throughout the period of their service in the Army of the Union, and that it was composed upon the data furnished by the journals of one or both of those princes, collated with his own observations and recollections. I have accordingly accepted the well-authenticated rumor which ascribes its authorship to him. I have also taken the liberty of affixing to the translation a title which more fully describes the scope and nature of the paper. As the reader will perceive, it is a critical and historical sketch of the rise, progress, character and fortunes of the army which was assembled at Washington for the invasion of Virginia, from the time of its first organization in 1861, down to the end of the campaign before Richmond in 1862. It is written with the freedom and force of an accomplished military man, anxious to do justice to the merits and to point out the defects of an army which he has studied in the camp and in the field; master of his subject; temperate in tone, and in stylo equally free from the carelessness of the amateur, and the pedantry of the professional soldier. Recent events have given a peculiar importance to the facts here presented, and it will not be easy for any candid person to read these pages without feeling that the causes of the military misfortunes which will make the year 1862 so painfully remarkable in our history demand the fullest and most searching investigation. (3)
4 PREFACE. The failure of the Army of the Potomac to achieve either of the grand immediate objects wliieh it moved from before 'Washington in March to effect, the dispersion, namilv. of the main confederate army under General Johnston and the occupation of llichmond. has been variously attributed: 1. To the constitutional unfitness of General McClellan for the conduct of operations requiring boldness! in the conception and decision in the execution. 2. To the presumed bias of that commander’s political opinions. Those who adopt this theory of the origin of our reverses, charge upon General McClellan that, he has always sought to avoid driving the insurgent States to the wall, in the belief that the soothing inlluence of time and the blockade would eventually bring them to accept terms of reconciliation and reunion. 3. To the constant interference of mt “Anlic Council” at ’Washington with the plans of our commanders in the field, an interference which when it does not positively interrupt the progress of operations actually begun, If depriving a general of some portion of the force on which his Calculations were based, must still greatly cripple his ellicieney by making it incompatible with common prudence for him to take serious risks and essay adventurous combinations. 4. To the superior military abilities of the Southern commanders enabling them to outmanoeuvre our leaders and to accumulate overwhelming forces upon the separate armies of an array in the aggregate greatly outnumbering their own. ' The testimony under these different heads of the Prince de Joinville may be thus summed up: 1. The Prince de Joinville testifies that General nlcClellan’s original plan of campaign was in the highest degree direct and aggressive. This ]>Ian wns formed at a time when the command of the waters of “rginia was entirely in our hands, and it involved so rapid a concentration of the federal forces at a point within striking distance of Pichmond as must hat e been followed either by the evacuation of that city or by :t decisive action in the field. II b-'tifu-s also that when by the sudden and formidable advent of the .Merrimac and by the retreat of Johnston from -Manassas upon Itichmond and Yorktown, this original plan w:ls made impracticable, Gem al McClellan conceived a second plan for turning the position at Yorktown, which was also direct and aggre-site in its character, and which was made impracticable
PREFACE. 5 by the sudden withdrawal of the corps farmee necessary to its execution. In respect to the operations of McClellan before Richmond, he testifies that it was the intention of that general to follow up his arrival upon the Chickahominy by an immediate assault in combination with the army of McDowell, and that this intention was defeated by the complete separation of that army from his own in consequence of orders sent to McDowell from Washington. He gives it as his opinion, however, that greater activity and more rapid aggressive movements on the part of General McClellan daring the months of ''lay and June and at the battle of Fair Oaks, might possibly have resulted in the fall of Richmond, but this opinion he qualifies by intimating that the disposition of the General to instant action was curbed and dampened during that time by the influence of the checks previously imposed upon the development of his strategy; and he ascribes the final extrication of the Army of the Potomac from a position which had become untenable, to a movement in an extraordinary degree decisive and audacious. 2. Writing after a familiar intercourse of months with the General-in-Chief of the army, in which he must necessarily have imbibed his leading views in respect to national policy, the Prince’s language makes it more than probable that General McClellan earnestly believed a prompt and decisive victory over the confederate army to be the surest if not the only means of securing the restoration of the Union, and that so believing, he thought it essential that a conciliatory temper towards the Southern people should precede, accompany and succeed the victory of the sword. 3. The Prince de Joinville asserts distinctly that the interference of the Government with the plans of General McClellan was constant, embarrassing, and of such a nature as finally to make it next to impossible for that General to risk the safety of the army under his charge in any extensive operation the success of which was not substantially assured in advance. 4. The Prince’s account of the retreat of McClellan from Richmond shows that he considers the confederate Generals to haxe been completely ont-manamvred and out-witted at that time by their adversary, whose concentration they did not comprehend in time to prevent it, and whose escape they were not able to intercept although superior to him in numbers and in knowledge of the country, fighting within sight of their base, and supported by the active good will of a whole population.
6 PREFACE. rims the evidence upon these four points of a witness whose competence and impartiality we have certainly no rijxht or reason to impend). lie may have been misinformed; uninformed, the rusponsibilit v which he assumes in publishing his narrative forbids us to suppose he can have been. Putil tiie publication of authentic oflieial documents, the paper here submitted to the reader must be considered to be the fullest and fairest story of the great Campaign of 1862 yet given to the world. As such it should receive the most serious attention. The reputation of any one man or set of men is a slight thing in comparison with the success or failure of the nation in a war of life and death. If the Prince de Joinville's statements can be proved incorrect and his inferences nnsmiml ; if General McClellan be rcaliv responsible by reason of his military incapacity or his political theories for our great disappointments, then it will be much for the nation to forgive him the past and forget him in the future. If the Prince's statements be proved correct and his inferences sound, they must be regarded as a substantial indictment of the Administration in respect to its management of the war ; and the removal of General McClellan from the command of his army in the field must be pronounced a sign of evil omen on which too much stress can hardly be laid. I believe the present translation, although rapidly made, will not be found inaccurate. 1 have ventured to append to it a few notes upon subjects connected with the condition of things at the South, in respect to which I had reason to believe myself more fully and corrcctlv informed than the circumstances of the author permitted him to be. W. II. II. Xkw York, \ov, 15, 18G2. Note. Since the fast edition of tliik translation was issued, I have received au- tliorm from Brigadicr-Geni ral Barry, Cliicf of Artillery of the Armv of the Potomac, to cor reel I he writer s Elul, w no n i in regard to I hl loss of guns on the retreat from Richmond ' p. .i., lusivad of three, the army lost but one siege-gun, tin S-inch howitzer, Ilie carriage of which broke down. No feature of this exlriHdinary retreat reflects high, r credit upon the army than this brilliant achievement of the artillery service and its chief; and ns the most extravagant falsehoods upon this point have obtained credence and cir< illation abroad, 1 take a pin lictilar pleasure in here recording the lent II, conlident that no man out of ii. erica will more heartily rejoice in it than the ■ 'hot whom 1 am thus enabled Io sc right.
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. Military events succeed each other rapidly in America, and the public follows them with an attention which is all the more anxious that it does not always understand them, partly through lack of knowledge of the organization of American armies and of the character of their commanders and their soldiers; but above all, through the difficulty of getting at the impressions of persons who, being competent to observe these memorable struggles, actually took part in them themselves. The pages here offered to the reader, will perhaps meet this legitimate public curiosity. They are the sum and setting forth of the notes of an officer, who took part in the last battles in Virginia, and who has never ceased to watch and follow up the grand operations of the war, in respect to which, he will, no doubt, give us new details; our duty is simply to gather up and group the impressions and the recollections scattered through the numerous letters, and the private journal of the officer in question. I. Cbc Creation of fbt ^rnui. On my arrival in America, the curtain had just fallen on the first act of the secessionist insurrection. The attack on Fort Sumter by the people of Charleston, had been the prologue, then came the disaster of Bull Run. The army of the
s THE ARMY OF THE I’OTOMAC. South was encamped Avitliin sight of Washington. Works of defence were hastily thrown up around that Capital. The roar of the cannon was heard from time to time along the front of the line. Amid these commotions the army of the 1’otomac came into being. Up to this time, the Federal Government, taken by surprise, had only hit in haste upon certain provisional measures which aggravated instead of dissipating the danger. All the advantages, at the outset of the insurrection, were with the insurgents. They were ready for an armed conflict, the Forth whs not. In truth the work of secession had been long preparing. I'nder the pretext of a military organization to repress slave insurrections, the States of the South had created a permanent militia, ready to march at the first signal. Special schools had been founded in which the sons ot the Slaveholders imbibed the inspiration of those good and bad qualities which combine to form a race of soldiers. .Meanwhile, the northern man, reposing with confidence upon the regular operation of the Constitution, remained absorbed in his own affairs behind his counter. The national army of the Union belonged almost entirely to the men of the South. For many years the Federal power had been in their hands, and they had not failed to fill, with creatures of their own, al] the departments of its administration, and especially the war oflice and the army. 'Mr. Jefferson Davis, long Secretary at War, had done more to accomplish this than any other single man. The disposition of the northern people facilitated his task. Among the laborious and till somewhat puritanical populations of New Fnglaml, the career of arms was looked upon as that of an idler. The Wot Point Academy enjoyvd no great consideration in that part of the i^jimtry, and the heads of families wen; by no means anxious to send their sons to it. Finally,
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 9 on the eve of the crisis which was to follow Mr. Lincoln’s election, Mr. Floyd, now a General among the secessionists and then war Secretary under Mr. Buchanan, had taken pains to send to the South the contents of all the Federal arsenals, and to despatch the whole of the regular army to Texas, putting between the army and Washington the barrier of the slave States, in order to paralyze the sentiment of duty which might lead the soldiers to follow that small number among their officers who should remain loyal to their flag. Nothing accordingly was lacking in the precautions taken by the Confederacy. They had dealt with the navy as with the army. It was dispersed at the four corners of the globe. As to the North, it did just nothing. Yet it had not 'wanted warnings. For many years Secession had been openly preached. A curious book called the “ Partisan Leader,” published twenty years ago, is a proof of this. Under the form of a novel this book is a really prophetic picture of the war which is at this moment desolating Virginia, a picture so highly colored as easily to explain tire ardor with which the imagination of the Creole ladies has espoused the cause of the South. But it was believed in the North, as in various other places, that “all would come right.” The North felt itself the stronger, and saw no reason for troubling itself prematurely. It was the old story of the hare and the tortoise. Moreover, in the last resort, the North counted on the several hundred thousand volunteers set down in the almanacks as representing the military force of the country, and supposed by the popular mind to be irresistible. The North was quickly undeceived. The people of the South were beaten in the presidential election. They ■were still masters of the Senate, and it was not the loss of power which roused them, it was the wound inflicted on their pride. This was used by the ambitions managers of the party of Secession to excite the South-
10 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. crn mind, and the standard of the insurrection was raised Tlie federal power, still passive, allowed the period for compromise, the period for conciliation, and the period for energetic and instantaneous repression to roll by alike unimproved, <>n both sides the States begin to arm for the inevitable strife; but the South has the warriors, the arms, the organization, the will and the passion. TheXorth is impotenteven to provision Port Sumter, and the volunteers raised for three months, as if that was to be the limit of the campaign, get themselves beaten at Bull linn, not through want of courage, for the instances of individual valor were numerous; nor yet through the fault of General McDowell, who commanded them, and whose । dans deserved success, but through the absence of organization and of discipline. After Bull Hun there was no room left for illusions. A great war was before the country. Intoxicated with pride, encouraged by all those who for one or another reason wished ill to the United States, the South it was plain would never again consent to return to the Union until it should have suffered severe reverses. The hopes of its ambitious leaders were more than realized. They had struck a successful vein, and nothing could make them abandon it. At the Xorth, on the other hand, humiliation liml opened all men’s eyes. It was felt that, having on their side, with the superiority of population and wealth, the right and the legality of the question—having the sacred trust of the Constitution to defend against a factions minority, which after all, only took up arms to extend slavery—they would become a b . -word for the world if thev did not resist, They Mt. besides, that if the doctrine of secession were once admitted and sanctioned, it would be susceptible of infinite application; that, from one rupture to another, it would bring about a chaos which must very soon open the way to dcspo-
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 11 tism. They felt, in short, that it was chimerical to suppose that two Powers could live side by side in peace who had not yet made real trial of their respective strength — who were separated radically, notwithstanding their common tongue and origin, by the institution of slavery—the one wishing its development and the other its abolition—who were separated, also, by interests which no Custom House line could conciliate, and by the impossibility of regulating, without daily quarrels, the numerous questions connected with the navigation of the Western rivers. All these reasons, obvious to every mind, added to the pain of wounded self-love, and to the novelty of a warlike movement in that land of peace, resulted in setting- on foot the immense armament with which the Northern States have up to this day sustained the war against the powerful efforts of Secession. Let us pause here before passing on to the numerous criticisms that we shall have to make, to admire the energy, the devotion, the spirit of courageous self-denial with which the population of those States—rather leading the Government than led by it—has of itself, and under the single impulse of its patriot?? good sense, given uncounted men and money, sacrificed its comforts, renounced voluntarily and for the public good, its tastes, its habits, even to the freedom of the press, and that, too, not under the influence of a momentary passion, not in a transport of transient enthusiasm, but coolly and for a distant object—that of national greatness. The North went seriously to work to create an army—a grand army. Seconded by public opinion, Congress resolved upon the raising of five hundred thousand men, with the funds necessary for the purpose. Unfortunately it could not command the traditions, the training and the experience requisite to form and manage such a military force. It was able to collect masses of men and immense material, as if by enchantment; but it had not the power to create by a vote
12 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. (lie spirit of discipline, of obedience, and that hierarchical re-peet. without Avltich there may be armed crowds, but there can be no army. Here is the reef upon which many gencr- oii> efforts have been dashed to pieces. Here is an original vice whose fatal inllucnee we shall everywhere encounter. We shall discover the germ of this vice by a rapid examination of the machinery which was used to improvise this first creation. According to American law the Federal Government maintains, in time of peace, a permanent regular army. It may, besides, in cases of necessity, war or insurrection, call io its standard as many regiments of volunteers as it may deem expedient. The regular army, formed by recruiting only, numbered 2O.000 men before the secession. The officers, educated exclusively at the military school, were remarkable. Well educated, versed practically in their profession, understanding the necessity of absolute command, they maintained in their small force lite most vigorous discipline. This was :m excellent nucleus for an army, but the rebellion, as I have before remarked, hail brought on its dissolution. The greater part of the officers—more than three hundred—passed over to the South. The soldiers—till Irish or German—lost in the solitudes of Texas, were dispersed. From two to three thousand men, at most, returned from California or Utah to take partin the war. This was chiefly important as bringing back a certain number of officers who might preside over the organization—such as it was-—of the army of volunteers about to be raised. In Europe, where we have learned to recognize the comparative value of the regular soldier, and of this ci tly and capricious amateur soldier, who is called a volunteer. the lo.-s of the aid of the regular army, small as it was, would have brought us to despair, and we should have set to umk to increase the army by enlarging its organization and ucorpomting recruits. An army of sixty thousand regulars
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 13 would have done more than double or triple the number of volunteers; but in America they do not know this, and besides, they do not wisli to know it. It would involve a renunciation jf the general and deeply rooted creed, that every American, when he wishes to do a thing, may find within himself, without any apprenticeship, the power to do it; and, consequently, there is no volunteer who, when he puts on the uniform, does not at the same time put on the qualities of a soldier. Add to this that the West Point officers, simply from the fact that they have received a superior education, and recognize the necessity of a hierarchy, are regarded as aristocrats, and everything aristocratic is bad. Such officers were safe with the mercenaries who consented to obey them, and under their orders to keep the peace against the frontier tribes of Indians; but to place under their command a great army, which must be reduced to the subordination of the camps, was to run the risk of grave political dangers. An eighteenth Brumaire is not to be made with volunteers. Therefore, everything having to be created, it was decided to create an army of volunteers—an ephemeral army, comparatively inefficient, and, above all, ruinously expensive. The American volunteer is richly paid. Ilis pay is $13—more than 65 francs—per month. Besides that, an allowance of $3 per month is paid to his wife in his absence; and this, it may be said in passing, has brought about many sudden marriages at the moment of departure for the army. Ordinarily there are no deductions from his pay for clothing or other supplies. The volunteer is provided with everything, and is supplied so liberally with rations that he daily throws away a part of them. One may imagine what such an army must cost. This would not matter if even at such an expense the country were well served. It is not so, however. It is ill served for want of discipline, not that the military laws and regulations were not severe enough ; but they were not enforced, and
14 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. could not be, in consequence of the primary organization of the regiment, and of the composition of its corps of officers. And here we come to the essential vice of an American army. How is a regiment of volunteers actually formed ? As soon as Congress has voted the number of men, they calculate at A ishington the quota which each State must furnish, according to its resources and population. This calculation being made, each Governor announces that there are to be so many regiments raised within the limits of his jurisdiction. The regiment of one battalion only, is the American military unit Affairs arc managed in this way : Persons present themselves offering to raise a regiment. Each sets forth his claims, his intinence in the State, or amone a certain portion of the population, which will enable him to procure easily the necessary number of men, his devotion to the party in power, etc. From among the persons thus presented the Governor makes his choice. Generally the person upon whom the choice falls lias laid it down as a condition precedent that he shall have the command of the regiment; and thus Mr. So-and-So, a lawyer or a doctor, never having handled a sword, but feeling within himself an improvised vocation, becomes a colonel at the start, and puts himself in connection with all the recruiting agencies and with all the furnishers of equipment and clothing supplies for the future reghnent. The next thing is to find the soldiers; this is not so easy, for there is a great deal of rivalry. They apply to all Hnir comrades, traverse the country, mid resort to various plan.-. 'fliis is done quickly and well in America, for the Americans have an inventive mind. Most frequently they iind friends who, seized with (he same martial ardor, promise to bring so many recruits if they be made—the one captain, tin- other lieutenant, another sergeant, and so forth. The IraincAork is formed and is partly filled up ; it only remains to complete it. ft h then that recourse is had to extraor
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 15 dinary measures—to those gigantic posters whit (i set forth in pompons terms all the advantages to be gained by joining the corps. They go among the Catholic priests to procure Irishmen, and give the coveted privilege of sutlership to the individual who promises the necessary complement of men. Thus the regiment finds itself organized, and the lists are carried to the Governor, who approves everything. The regiment is mustered, clothed and equipped, and forwarded by railroad to the scat of war. Sometimes, even frequently, the grades are made to depend on election : but that is generally only a formality, as everything has been arranged beforehand by those interested. The inconveniences of this system are obvious. The officers, from the colonel down to the lowest in rank, do not know the first word of the military art, and if they have any real aptitude for it and any warlike qualities, these are still to be proved. The soldiers have no illusions on this point. “They know no more about it than we do, we are well acquainted with them,” they say of those who command them. Hence, there is no superiority of knowledge on the part of the officer over the soldier, and no superiority of social position in a country where no such superiority is recognized. Most frequently, also, it is with an idea of being a candidate for political office that the officer has taken up arms. It is to make himself a name in the eyes of the voters. And these future voters are the soldiers. What would become of the popularity he expects to enjoy if he were rough to the roldiers, or showed himself too exacting in the service? All these causes bring about the want of authority with officers, and the want of respect among soldiers. Of course, then, there can be neither hierarchy nor discipline. All this has been ameliorated bv force of necessity, and in the school of experience. Even from the beginning there were exceptions to it; some colonels, impelled by a real vocation, or animated by an ardent patriotism,
1G THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. succeeded in overcoming the obstacles placed in their path. Sometimes an oilicer of the regular army, desirous of distin- guidung himself, ami having intluencc enough in his State, raised a regiment and obtained from it an admirable result. Thus, a young lieutenant of engineers, named Warren, was marvellously successful with the Fifth New York regiment, of which he was colonel. This regiment served as engineers and artillery at the siege of Yorktown, and, having again become infantry, conducted itself like the most veteran troops at the battles of the ('liickahominy, where it lost half of its forfe. And yet these were volunteers—but, they felt the knowledge and superiority of their chief. Generally, however, the chief is simply a comrade who wears a different costume. lie is obeyed in every day routine, but voluntarily. In the same way the soldiers don’t trouble themselves about him when cir cumstances become serious. From the point of view of American equality, there is no good reason to obey him. Besides, in the eyes of the greater number this title of volunteer docs not signify the soldier who devotes himself generously and voluntarily to save the country or to acquire glory, but rather the well-paid soldier, who only does what lie wishes and pleases, This is so true that, ^though the fly and time of service are the same for volunteers and regulars, the re- ernitjng of regulars has become almost impossible. All that class of men who enlisted when regulars alone existed, from a taste for camp life, now join the volunteers. On one side is license. on 1hc other discipline—the choice is easily made. The habits created by universal suffrage also play their part an i are reproduced on the field of battle* By a tacit agreement the regiment marches against the enemy, advances under lire and begins to deliver its volleys; the men are brave, very brave; they are killed and wounded in great numbers, and then, wnmi by a tacit agreement they think they have done enough for military honor, they all march off together. The
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 17 colonel perhaps attempts to give a direction, an impulse, but generally his efforts are in vain. As to the officers, they never think of it. Why should they attempt it, and why should they be obeyed if the majority of the regiment has made up its mind to retreat? Obedience in such an army is like the obedience which children playing atsoldiersrender to him among their comrades whom they have made their captain. Is any argument necessary to show the inconvenience of such a state of things? Nevertheless, the Government put its hand on an immense mass of armed men, a multitude of regiments; for the country had responded unanimously and vigorously to the call for volunteers. Never, wre believe, has any nation created, of herself, by her own will, by her single resources, without coercion of any kind, without government pressure, and in such a short space of time, so considerable an armament. Free governments, whatever may be their faults and the excesses to which they may give rise, always preserve an elasticity and creative power which nothing can equal. Only, the vices of organization which we have pointed out singularly impaired the value of this military gathering. It was to remedy these vices as far as possible that General McClellan and old officers of West Point, who had become, by fdree of circumstances, generals of brigade or of division, devoted all their efforts. Regiments were brigaded by fours, and brigades divisioned by threes. To each division four batteries were given, three of them served by volunteers and one by regulars. The latter was to serve as a model for the others, and its captain took command of all the artillery of the division. At one time they had some idea of placing a battalion of regulars in each division of volunteers, to act the part of “ lance head,” which Lord Clyde attributes to the European troops in the Sepoy armies; but the idea was abandoned. It appeared wiser to keep together the only 2
IS THE ARMY or THE POTOMAC. icallv disciplined troops that they possessed; besides, as it was made, the divisional formation was a good one, and Las been of verv great utility. It next became necessary to provide for the administrative services for provisions, munitions and transports, and to organize artillery reserves, the engineer corps, the pontoon corps, the topographical brigade, the telegraphs and the hospitals. This prodigious labor was accomplished with a rapidity and a success which are extraordinary, when we think that the whole thing had to be achieved without any assistance from the past. 2\ot onh nas there nobody to be found who knew anything, except from hooks, of the management of the numerous threads by which an army is held together and moved : not only was the country destitute of all precedents in the matter ; the number even of those who had travelled in Europe and seen for themselves what a grand collection of troops is, was infinitely small. The American army had no traditions but those of the Mexican campaign of General Scott—a brilliant c^npaign, in which there were many diffi Unities to be overcome, but which presented nothing like the gigantic proportions of the present war. Moreover, in Mexico General Scott had with him the entire regular army, and here there only remained its feeble ruins. In Mexico the regulars were the main body, the volunteers were only the accessory, and, as it were, the ornament. The old general, who was one day asked what he then did to maintain discipline in their ranks. answered, "Oh, they knew that if they straggled off they would be massacred by the guerrillas.’’ The two cases, therefore, had nothing in common, and the management of tlie-e great armies of volunteers, in spite of all the efforts to regularize them, was a problem which offered many unknown data. ' At the Smith the organization of the insurrectionary forces presented fewer difficulties. nic revolutionary government
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 19 had quickly assumed in the hands of Mr. Jefferson Davis the dictatorial form. Sustained by an Oligarchy of three hundred thousand slaveholders, of whom he was the choice, and whose violent passions he personified, Mr. Davis had set himself actively at work to cieate an army fit to contend against the formidable preparations of the federal government. A former pupil of West Point, a former General of volunteers in Mexico, a former Secretary of War in the Union, he had all the requisite conditions to perform his task well. Ue applied to it his rare capacity. He was seconded by the flower of the former federal staff, by the more military spirit of the Southerners, and also by the assistance of all the adventurers, filibusters and others, whom the South had always nurtured in view of those continual invasions to which slavery condemns her. I have no idea of drawing here a sketch of the separatist army; but I wish to point out two important differences which mark its organization as compared with that of the North. The officers were chosen and nominated directly by the President, and were sent with the regiments to fill their positions. There was no comradeship between them and the soldiers. The soldiers did not know them, and therefore regarded them as their superiors. They were not men who were subsequently, in private life, to find themselves again their equals. In short these officers belonged to that class of slave owners who living by the labor of their inferiors and accustomed to command them, attached to the soil by the hereditary transmission of the paternal estate and of the black serfs who people it, possess to a certain extent, the qu alities of aristocrats. In theii hands the discipline of the army could not suffer. Numerous shootings caused discipline to be respected, and on the day of battle they led their soldiers valiantly, and were valiantly followed. In the second place, Mr. Davis quickly perceived that the volunteer system would be powerless to furnish him wi ch enough men to sustain th b fratricidal strife into which
20 THE AHMY OF THE POTOMAC. he had plunged his country. lie came rapidly to conscription, to forced recruiting. It was no longer a contract betwee. J the soldier and his colonel, or between the soldier and the State, which would still leave a possibility of its being annulled, and which brought with it absolute obligations. It was the law, the authority, the power of the State, which carried off all able-bodied men and made them march up blindly to what was called the defence of their country. There was no hesitation possible. Hound by the obligation of duty, the soldier became at once more submissive and more reconciled to the sacrifice. In the situation in which the South was, these measures were wise, and there is no doubt that they contributed at the beginning of the war to secure great advantages to its army. Nevertheless, we are far from reproaching Air. Lincoln for not having recourse lb such, violent measures. The leaders of an insurrection recognize no obsftcle, and are stopped by no scruples when the object is to assure the triumph of their ambitious views, and particularly to escape the consequences of defeat. They recoil before nothing, and have no repugnance to revolutionary expedients; but Mr. Lincoln and his advisers were the legitimate representatives of the nation, and if it fell to them to suppress a revolt, they did not wish, unless in ease of 'absolute necessity, to touch the guarantees which, up to that time, had made the American people the happiest and freest people of the earth. II plans of ibe ©nnrpnign. The army once iinjjroviscd, it next became necessary tc decide 1 >w to employ it—in other words, to choose the plan of the campaign. The general plan was simple. The idea of conquering and occupying a territory so vast as that of the
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 21 Confederate States could not even be considered ; but for the purpose of escaping the dangers, actual and possible, of such a formidable insurrection, it was necessary to attain three results: to blockade efficiently the insnrgflit coast; to get control of the Mississippi liver, and of the entire system of Western waters ; and, finally, to drive the rebel government out Richmond, its capital. By the blockade the rebels are isolated from the foreigners whose sympathy had been promised them ; the introduction of powder and firearms is prevented ; exportation, and the resources which it might have procured, are stopped ; and, finally, the introduction of supplies from abroad is guarded against, which would, in spite of the state of war, have penetrated into the North, to the great detriment of national manufactures and of the Federal treasury. To the navy belonged the duty of this blockade. It discharged that duty rather inefficiently at first for want of sufficient means ; but by degrees the surveillance grew closer and closer until it became difficult to evade it. The possession of the Mississippi was an imperious neces- sitv. The great river and its affluents are the outlets of all the countries which they water. They are the arteries of the Western States—States which have, up to this time, remained faithful to the Union, but in which their material interests might at length chill their enthusiasm, and speak even louder than their convictions. To restore the Union as a matter of interest, on the basis of slavery, has been for a long time past the programme of the Southern leaders. To abandon to them without a struggle the Western rivers would be to concede half the question. It was therefore decided to bring on a conflict on this theatre. The navy recaptured New Orleans by a brilliant coup de main. That was the principal point. The Federals thus put the key in their pocket. As to the course of the Mississippi, the task of reconquering it was confided to the Western armies, admirably seconded by Commodore
22 THE AUMY OF I HE POTOMAC. Foote's flotilla of iron-clad batteries and steam rams. In those regions the war assumed quite a new character. So long as they were carried on only by water the operations were verv rapid. The enemy could not intercept the mag- niticent navigable highways so favorable to attack which the dreat rivers of the West supplied. By water Columbus »as besieged, whilst by quickly ascending the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, the communications ot the rebel army assigned to the defence of that important post, were cut. Once isolated from its railroads, that army had to retreat southwards. It thus retired from position to position, as fast as the Northern flotilla descended the river, and as the Northern army seized upon the princip.nl railroad branches. The march of the Fcdertds only slackened when, being able to advance no farther by navigable waters, parallel to the Mississippi, such as the Tennessee, they had to reconstruct, as they went along, the railroads necessary for their supplies, which the enemy had destroyed in falling back. 'Ihe last operation remained—to drive out of Richmond the insurrectionary government. That government, on being concentrated in the hands of H1'- Ravis, took the form of a dictatorship, and thus gave to its seat the inwortanee of a capital. There converge all the great railroad and telegraph lines. Thence, for a year past, have all orders and despatches been dated. To force the Confederate government to abandon that capital would be to inilict upon it an immense check—in the eyes of Europe particularly it would have taken away its prestige. Should this attack have been ventured on as soon as the means supposed to be sudicient were provided, without awaiting the results of the blockade and of the Mississippi campaign t On this question opinions were di?ided. Some ■ aid " yes," arguing tbus : that an insurrection should never be gi en the lime to establish itself; that till Federal army, with its defective organization, would be no better in March
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 23 than in November; that a splendid success on the part of the North, following close upon Bull Run, miglr. finish the war at one blow, by permitting a great effort at conciliation before either side became too much embittered. Others said “ no.” According to them the great work of reducing the insurrection should be performed on the coast and on the Mississippi. The Richmond campaign, undertaken in the spring, with the Army of the Potomac, made hardier by a winter passed in tents, and recovered from the fatal impressions of Bull Run, would be the coup de grace to Secession. The latter course was chosen, either as the result of real deliberation, or of necessity from not having decided in time to act during the fine weather of the autumn of 1861. And here I may point out, in passing, a characteristic trait of the American people—that is, as well in regard to the people as to an agglomeration of individuals—delay. This delay in resolving and acting, so opposed to the promptitude, the decision, the audacity to which the American, considered as an individual, had accustomed us, is an inexplicable phenomenon which always causes me the greatest astonishment. Is it the abuse of the individual initiative that kills the collective energy ? Is it the habit of calculating only on one’s self and of acting only for one’s self that renders them hesitating and distrustful when they must act with the assistance of others? Is it the never having learned to obey that makes it so difficult to command ? Doubtless something of all these causes, and other causes still that escape us, must combine in producing this result, as strange as it is unaccountable ; but this delay in action which, besides, appears to belong to the Anglo-Saxon race, is atoned for by a tenacity and a perseverance which failure does not discourage. Let us, then, leave the federal fleets occupied in blockading the rebel coast, in recapturing Now Orleans, in aiding General Halleck to reconquer the course of the Mississippi, and let us
2-1 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. follow the career of the Army of the Potomac, destined to en gage the great confederate army and to wrest from it, if possible, the pos-ession of the Virginian capital. The winter had passed, for the Northern soldiers, in the work of organization, of drilling, of provisioning; besides, they had constructed around \\ ashington a series of works, of detached forts (to use a well known expressia a) which, armed with powerful artillery, would protect the capital from a sudden assault, even though the Armv of the Potomac might be absent. The construction of these works furnished scope for thought to those who sought to penetrate the projects <i»f the General; but everything had long been so quiet at Washington that it was only casually that the idea of entering on a campaign presented itself. T'hc enemy still occupied, in great force, his positions of Manassas and Centreville, and for six months past nothing but unimportant skirmishes had occurred between the two armies. 'I hings were in this condition when, on the evening of the 9th of March, one of my friends, tapping me on the shoulder, said : " Yon don’t know the news ? The enemy has evacuated Manassas. and the army sets out to-morrow.” Next day, in reality, the whole city of Washington was in commotion. A mass of artillery, of cavalry, of wagons, blocked up the streets, moving towards the bridges of the Potomac. On the sidewalks were seen ollicers bidding tender farewells to -weeping ladies. The civilian ]«-tion of the population looked coldly on this departure. There was not the least trace of enthusiasm among them. Perhaps this was due to the rain, which was tailing in torrents. On the long bridge, in the midst of several batteries that were laboriously defiling across this bridge which is eternally in rains. I met (.eneral Ve( lellan, on horseback, with an anxious air, riding ahme, without aids-de-camp, and escorted only by a few troopers. . Ie who could that day have read the General’s soul would have seen there already something of that
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 25 bitterness which subsequently was to accumulate so cruelly upon him. Beyond the bridge we found the whole army in motion towards Fairfax Court House, where a great part of it encamped that evening. The cavalry pushed on as far as Centreville and Manassas, which it found abandoned. The enemy was not come up with anywhere; he had had too greatly the start of us. The head-quarters were established , as well as possible at Fairfax, a pretty village, with large frame houses standing apart and surrounded by gardens. The population had fled at our approach, almost without an exception. The next day I accompanied a cavalry reconnoissance to Centreville, where I saw the immense barracks which the Confederates had occupied during the winter, and to Manassas, whose smoking ruins left on the mind a deep impression of sadness. On our return we visited the battle field of Bull Run. General McDowell was with us. He could not restrain his tears at the sight of those bleaching bones, which recalled to him so vividly the cruel recollection of his defeat. While we were making these promenades grave events were occurring in the highest regions of the army. There exists in the American army, as in the English, a commander-in-chief who exercises over the head of all the generals, a supreme authority, regulates the distribution of the troops and directs military operations. These functions, which have been greatly curtailed in the British army, since the Crimean war, were still exercised with all their vigor in America. From the aged General Scott, who had long honorably discharged them, they had passed to General McClellan. We learned on reaching Fairfax, that they had been taken away from him. It is easy to understand the diminution of force and the restrictions upon his usefulness, thus inflicted upon the general-in-chief by a blow in the rear at the very outset of his campaign. Yet tl'.is was but a part of the mischief done him. McClellan
THE AE MY OF THE POTOMAC. 26 had known, better than anybody else, the real strength of the rebels at Manassas and Centreville. He was perfectly familiar with the existence of the ‘’wooden cannon” by which it has been pretended that he was kept in awe for six monBs. Hut he also knew that till the month of April the roads of Virginia are in such a state that wagons and artillery can only be moved over them by constructing phmk roads, a tedious operation. during which the enemy, holding the railways, could either retreat, as lie was then actually doing, or move for a blow upon some other point. In any event, had McClellan attacked and carried Centreville, pursuit was impossible and victory would have been barren of results. A single bridge burned would have saved Johnston’s whole army. Such are the vast advantages of a railway for a retreating army—advantages which do not exist for the army which pursues it. We have the right, we think, to sav that McClellan never in tended to advance upon Centreville. His long determined pu pose wa» to make V ashington safe by means of a strong garrison, and then to use the great navigable waters and immense naval resources of the North to transport the army by sea to a point near Richmond. For weeks, perhaps for months, this plan had been secretly maturing. Secresy as well as promptness, it will be understood, was indispensable here to success. To keep the secret it had been necessary to confide it to few per sons, ami hence had arisen one great cause for jealousy of the < lemwl. He this as it may, as the day of action drew near, those who siopectcd the General's project, and were angry at not being inlormod of it; those whom his promotion had excited to envy ; liis political enemies ; (who is without them in .America 0 in short all those beneath or beside him who wished him ill, broke mil into a chorus of accusations of slowness, inaction, incapacity. .McClellan, with a patriotic courage which I havt
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 27 always admired, disdained these accusations, and made no reply. He satisfied himself with pursuing his preparations in laborious silence. But the moment came in which, notwithstanding the loyal support given him by the President, that functionary could no longer resist the tempest. A council of war of all the divisional generals was held; a plan of campaign, not that of McClellan, was proposed and discussed. McClellan was then forced to explain his projects, and the next day they were known to the enemy. Informed no doubt by one of those thousand female spies who keep up bis communications into the domestic circles of the federal enemy, Johnston evacuated Manassas at once. This was a skillful manoeuvre. Incapable of assuming the offensive; threatened with attack either at Centreville, where defence would be useless if successful, or at Richmond, the loss M which would be a grave check, and unable to cover both positions at once, Johnston threw his whole force before the latter of the two. For the Army of the Potomac this was a misfortune. Its movement was unmasked before it had been made. Part of its transports were still frozen up in the Hudson. Such being the state of affairs, was it proper to execute as rapidly as possible the movement upon Richmond by water, or to march upon Richmond by land? Such was the grave question to be settled by the young general in a miserable room of an abandoned house at Fairfax within twenty-four hours. And it was at this moment that the news of his removal as general-inchief reached him ; the news, that is, that he could no longer count noon the co-operation of the other armies of the Union, and that the troops under his own orders were to be divided into four grand corps under four separate chiefs named in order of rank; a change which would throw into subaltern positions some young generals of division who had his personal confidence. It is easy to see that here was matter enough to
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