[ Doc. No. 82. ] & the Federal Government. And, besides, there is not the same temptations to those odious combinations and compromises among a few of the great interests for the prostration of the remainder. But surely no argument is required to prove that the money which is not requisite for the public exigencies, ought to be left in the pockets of the people; for they, and they alone, have a right to it, when not required for necessary public expenditure; and, besides, each individual understands his true interests, and is disposed to pursuethem, better than either the State or Federal Governments. There is not even any preconcerted plan of distribution which can remedy the fearful evils consequent on the disposal of redundant revenue. There 4s no plan which can prevent the alarming concentration of power in the Federal Government, and the dependence and prostration of the State Governments, which will be sure to result from a surplus annual accumulation in the Treasury. Not to speak of the evils of raising large masses of money by means whose operation is not understood by the people, and who, consequently, would not be disposed to exercise that watchfulness over the proceedings of the federal functionaries, in relation to the financial concerns, which all history and experience have proved to be so indispensable both to the attainment and preservation of liberty. When the monarch has called upon his subjects for money, they, in turn, have called upon him for more liberty, and he could not resist the call when made under such circumstances. If the monarchs of Europe, bv some covert means like a restrictive policy, could have procured, unseen and uncalled for, all the money which was required for their lavish and magnificent expenditures, perhaps not one country in Europe could ever have been revolutionized. Those glorious struggles, which are the theme of praise on every lip, would never have been heard of, and a dark and silent despotism would reign in every countrv of Europe. We may be permitted to suggest that the Government can never be embarrassed by an occasional deficit of revenue; less, perhaps, than by even an occasional surplus. The credit of the Government would, at all times, answer the purposes of money. This credit would be fortified by the wise and wholesome parsimony of restricting expenditure to necessary objects-, and leaving in the hands of the people, to be improved by them, the resources which the Government could, at any time, command. The deficit of one year might be supplied without disadvantage in the next; but that a surplus should be unemployed in the Treasury, would be a loss to the community. From what has been said, it will be perceived that we concur very fully in the suggestion of the memorial, that the average duty actually required, would fall far short of twenty per cent. The memorial refers to twenty - five per cent, as the highest duty which should, in any case, be allowed. The undersigned, for avoiding misconceptions, beg leave respectfully to suggest that they do not understand the memorial to admit, that, if a lower average of duty than twenty per cent should be found sufficient, a discrimination should be still made to the extent of twenty-five per cent, and that this discrimination should be imposed in favor of protected articles. Thus understood, if an average duty of twelve and a half per cent should be found sufficient, there would be a double duty in favor of protected articles. Such a construction would be a departure from one of the principles which form the basis of the memorial—that duties shall be ultimately equal } ized, so that the duty on any article shall not vary materially from the net al average rate of all the duties together.
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