[ Doc. No. 82. j 7 ^erns, we believe will be admitted; of their ardent attachment to the Federal Government and Union, we think they have always given proof; and it is in|our power to assure your honorable body, that the opinion is deeply and indelibly impressed upon them, that the system in question is unjust, and in violation of their most valuable constitutional rights. There are many who conscientiously believe.that the majority ought rarely,’if ever, to change its policy at the instance of the minority; that, by doing so, it sacrifices its rights and privileges, and teaches the minority the dangerous art of thwarting the course of the dominant party, by resisting its measures. We shall not. in this exposition, enter into the theory of Government, and its mode of formation; nor shall we inquire, whether, in an independent nation, the rule of a majority is founded on convention, or the great law of nature; but permit us briefly to advert to the history of our own Federal Government, and endeavor to show, from its very nature; that majorities in our national councils ought well to weigh the interest of minorities, and frequently, in the spirit of compromise, to recede from their measures, when considered by the minorities grievous and unjust. The Federal Union was formed by States with governments already organized and in full operation; and as, by the great law of nature, one sovereign State is considered equal to another, each State was of equal weight in the formation of our confederacy. So that our General Government was not a emanation froi i • jor' ft: e peoph of the Unite 1 States, but a creature of the States themselves. In the construction of the Government, however, the various interests of the Union seem to have been well understood, and, in the spirit of compromise, each had its due weight assigned to it. Our Federal Government, it will readily be conceded on all hands, was intended as a bond of union, and a supervisor of those great interests, national in their extent and importance, and which the local governments, from their limited spheres, could not so well attend to ; while the State Governments were wisely left, except in few instances, to manage the local interests of States. Hence, from the very theory of our Government, so different from all others, the General Government should guard against over action; and beware, as much as possible, of that kind of legislation which tampers, beyond the limits of necessity, with the various interests of the community, sometimes arraying the one against the other. But, say those who would contend for the perseverance of the majority in its course, the affairs of the nation are administered by officers chosen by the people, and responsible to them, and, consequently, the majority will not be likely to err for any length of time. To this we answer, that a Government constituted like our Federal Government, may always be expected to be vicious in its legislation, when directed to subjects bearing upon the local and conflicting interests of the country. The reason is obvious, on the slightest reflection. Such a Government, when exercised over so great an extent of country as ours, can never be expected to understand the local interests throughout sufficiently well to legislate for them. With the best intentions, therefore, it would ever have a fertile source of blunder and error in the constant and irremediable ignorance of local interests. But the Government would be likely to be vicious in its legislation, even if it understood those interests, in consequence of the high temptation which would ever be held out to some of those interests to combine and make common cause, until a majority is fprmed, and then to proceed to the oppression of the minority.
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