Speech of Hon. Alexander H. Stephens on the Bill to Admit Kansas as a State

9 affected by it in the Territqry, then I might have resorted to the courts. Mr. CAMPBELL. Did not the gentleman vote to repeal it because of its unconstitutionality ? Mr. STEPHENS. Standing as it did, I did, for that and other reasons. As long as it stood as a .regulation founded on the principle of a division of the Territory, I was willing to abide by it; but when it was abandoned and repudiated as such, it xas, in my judgment, an odious and unjust restriction. But I do not wish the gentleman to divert me from the line of argument I was pursuing. Mr. CAMPBELL. If the gentleman voted to repeal it in 1854 because it was unconstitutional, why did he vote to fasten it upon Texas in 1846, unless, in the meanwhile, there was a change in the Constiaition? Mr. STEPHENS. For the^very reason that I have just stated. In 1845, on the annexation of Texas, I voted for it, upon the principle of a division of the Territory. Congress has a right to pass all needful laws and regulations for the Territory, as property; so said Mr Madison; this ' includes the power to divide, if necessary or needful for public peace and harmony. When I voted for it, it was upon that principle. And, sir, it was in 1850, after the. gentleman’s party had repeatedly—in. 1846, 1847, 1848, 1849, and 1850 —denied, repudiated, and scouted at what they now call the time-honored compromise of our fathers of 1820, that I voted for the reestablishment of the old principle in our territorial policy ^of leaving the public domain open for the free and equal settlement and colonization of the people from all the States alike, without congressional limitations or restrictions upon any. This principle was reestablished in 1850—after the one proposed in 1820 had been abandoned—and this principle I voted to carry out in 1854, in the Territories of Kansas and Nebraska. Mr. CAMPBELL. Will the gentleman ex- plain to the House and to the country, how it is that a measure may be constitutional which excludes slavery on one side of a given line-in.a Territory belonging to the people-of the States in common, and unconstitutional on the other? Mr. STEPHENS. My explanation of the point the gentleman makes is this: Upon the principle of a division of the Territory as public property between the two sections, it might be constitutional to set aside a portion to one by fixed lines and boundaries/ while the appropriation of the whole of it to that section would be manifestly wrong, unjust, and therefore unconstitutional. Just as in the case of the division of the surplus revenue—public property—among the States—the part assigned to each, on division fairly and justly made, was constitutionally held; but if some States had taken all to the exclusion of the rest, that would have been manifestly unjust, and therefore unconstitutional. But I have given my views at large upon this subject once before this session. Mr. CAMPBELL. * Well then----- Mr. STEPHENS. I do not wish the gentleman to divert me from my argument by a continuation of questions upon other’subjects. Mr. CAMPBELL. I hope I may be fortunate have to obey, the laws as pronounced and expounded by the courts,. The difference between a republic and .a monarchy is, that the one is a government of laws, subject to be changed by the people ; the other is a government dependent upon the caprice or whim", and arbitrary will of one man. And. when the people of a Republic array themselves against their laws, the first step is into anarchy, and then comes monarchy. The speech of the gentleman from Indiana is sufficiently answered by the address of his own party adopted at Pittsburg, though those who issued it seemed not to be eonscious of the effect of the admission. That address, after specifying the same objectionable laws in the Kansas code which he has, says: “ That these despotic acts, even if they had been passed by a Legislature duly elected by the people of the Territory, would have been null and void, inasmuch as they are, plainly in violation of the Federal Constitution, is too clear for argument. Congress itself is expressly forbidden by the Constitution of the United States to make any laws abridging the'freedom of speech and of the press; and it is absurd to suppose that , a Territorial Legislature, deriving all its power from Congress, should not be subject to the same restrictions.” The latter is a very clear, proposition, to my mind. Neither Congres's nor a Territorial Legislature can pass any law abridging the freedom of Speech or of the press. This is, indeed, too-clear for argument. I indorse that part of the Pittsburg platform. But not a single disturbance in the Territory has grown out of either of these laws complained of as despotic. But if there had —if these laws be so clearly unconstitutional and so manifestly violative of the freedom of speech and of the press, why should not any party aggrieved refer the question to the judicial tribunals ? If the case is so clear, why not go to the courts? There are Federal courts in the Territory; and an appeal can be taken to the same high tribunal that all of us in such matters have to appeal to in the last resort—the Supreme Court of the United States. Mr. CAMPBELL, of Ohio, (interrupting.) I rise to propound a question, if it is entirely agreeable to the gentleman from Georgia, and not otherwise. Mr. STEPHENS. Perfectly agreeable; but I hope the gentleman will not take much of my time. Mr. CAMPBELL. I was similarly responded to on a former occasion, and I shall take warning, and occupy but a moment of the gentleman s time. Why did not you, and those who sought to disturb the time-honored compromise of our fathers of 1820 , if they regarded the eighth section of the Missouri act as unconstitutional, resort to the courts to test its constitutionality ? Mr. STEPHENS. There is a case of that sort now before the Supreme Court. Mr. CAMPBELL. Why, instead of bringing’ all this trouble on the country, did he not then resort to the courts? Mt. STEPHENS. Why, Mr. Speaker, it was first my ..duty as a legislator, believing it to be wrong, to vote to repeal it, and I did, so, [laughter;] and if the Congress of the United States had not repealed it, and I had been personally

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