16 had considered a national bank either a proper or necessary means to carry into effect any of the enumerated powers of the constitution, that they would have rejected a direct proposition to establish a bank, or refused to invest CohgreSs with power to grant charters of incorporation, of whatever description? Is it probable that wise and patriotic men would have acted so inconsistently—so absurdly? “It is known/’ says Mr. Jefferson, “that the very power now proposed as a means, was rejected as an end, by the convention which framed the constitution.” “k proposition,” he adds, “was made to them to authorize Congress to open canals, and an amendatory one to empower them to incorporate. But the whole was rejected ; and one of the reasons of rejection urged in debate was, that they then would have power to erect a bank.” Here then, sir, is authority not to be questioned, not to be controverted, that the power to erect a bank, “proposed as a means, was rejected as an end,” by the very authors of the constitution itself. The fact, therefore, that the framers'of the constitution deliberately and designedly withheld from Congress the power to incorporate a bank, utterly excludes the idea that such power was intended to be granted, either expressly or incidently, specifically or impliedly. To contend that a power, intentionally withheld from Congress by the framers of the constitution, can be rightfully exercised by Congress, is to outrage common sense, and all approved rules of construction. Let the principle be once established, that neither the express letter of an instrument, nor the evident intention of its author or authors, is to be taken as evidence of its meaning, and all written constitutions, contracts, laws, and charters, become a dead letter. I would entreat gentlemen to consider well before they give further countenance to such doctrines. I would respectfully remind them, that by disregarding the express provisions of the constitution, and the evident intention of its framers, and resorting to construction and implication alone for authority, they will eventually raise up a monument of folly, which, if not as impious, will create as much confusion as that which towered on Shitiar’s plain. Let it not be supposed, however, that I would deny the existence of all implied powers. I am aware, sir, that the convention, in framing the constitution, marked out and enumerated the principal ends of Government, without particularizing all the means by which these ends were to be secured. A discretionary power, io a certain extent, must necessarily be left with Congress. The constitution, for example, has. vested in Congress the power to raise and support armies. But at what time armies are to be raised, to what extent,, and for what cause this power is to be exercised, it has necessarily left to be determined by the national legislature. /Many other cases might be cited, Where the means necessary to. carry into effect the enumerated powers are left to the. selection of Congress. But the mean, or incidental power, ought, in all cases, to bear a due relationship to the specified power. It was well remarked by a distinguished Senator (Mr. Clay)-in debate, that: “ In all cases where incidental powers are acted upon, the principal and incidental ought to be congenial with' each other, and partake of a common nature. The incidental power ought to be strictly subordinate, and limited to the end proposed to be attained by the specified power. In other words, under the name of accomplishing one object which is specified, the power implied ought not to be made to embrace other objects', which are not specified in the constitution. If, then, you Could establish a bank to collect and distribute the revenue, it ought to be expressly restricted to the purpose of such collection and distribution. “ I contend that the States have the exclusive power to regulate contracts, to declare the capacities and incapacities to contract, and to provide as to the extent of responsibility of
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