crals of this country utterly reject and abhor the doctrine, that time or precedent can sanctify iniquity, or justify any infraction of the social compact. It is contended by another, but similar class of moralists,-that the constitution ought to be so construed, as to expand with the growth of the country, and conform to its diversified and mutable relations. Against this doctrine, also, I enter my protest. It is too ductile to be either safe or sound; too liable to be drawn out to dangerous lengths, and bent to mischievous purposes. Sir, what is the nature of the obligation under which we act? What is required of us before entering upon our duties as representatives? It is required, by the constitution, that “ the Senators and Representatives, and the members of the several State Legislatures, and all Executive and Judicial officers, both of the United Stales, and of the several States, shall be bound, by oath or affirmation, to support this constitution.” Sir, the requisition is emphatic and positive—couched in language not to be misunderstood. Our duty is palpable—we cannot err ignorantly. We are bound, by all the obligations which an oath imposes, to 11 support this constitution.” We are not required to “support” the forced constructions that may be given by a pliant court, or by a careless or venal legislature. We are not called upon to “support” a constitution corrupted by congressional interpolations, or distorted and sophisticated by the legal mummeries of the bar or the bench. Nor are we obligated to support a constitution that may be construed to change with times and circumstances; that may grow with the growth, and decay with the decline of the country: but we are bound by our solemn oaths or affirmations to “ support this constitution” in its purity and integrity, unsophisticated and uncontaminated. Sir, there are two classes of men in this world, who rely upon precedent, and who seem to believe in its infallibility, with a great deal of spirit and perseverance. The one, the morally lax, who have no objection to transgress, provided they can find a pretext in precedent; the other, the mentally indolent, who find less labor in adopting the opinions of others, than in analyzing and investigating for themselves ; while the rigidly honest and intellectually industrious, spurn all mental tyranny, refusing, in all cases, to yield their assent but as the result of their conviction. Sir, let me not be misunderstood when I say that precedent is dangerous and pernicious ; I mean that it is so when regarded as an obligatory rule in matters of legislation, and' in the common affairs of life. In courts of justice, in the dispensation of civil and criminal law, it may, to a certain extent, be advantageously referred to as a guide. For so diversified and complicated are the subjects of litigation, that it is impossible for the legislator to anticipate and provide for every case that may occur. It becomes the duty, therefore, of the judge, the organ of the law, not only to proclaim the written law of the land, but also to decide in cases where no statutory provision has been made, as reason and justice may dictate. Nor, as a general rule, ought decisions thus made be lightly regarded by succeeding judges, especially in cases where the points in litigation are analogous. But, sir, while 1 willingly admit that precedent may be properly referred to as authority in the administration of the law, I utterly deny that it is necessarily obligatory upon legislative bodies. It matters not, therefore, whether a precedent in favor of a United States bank be found in the acts of former legislatures, or in the decisions of the Supreme Court; it is, in either case, incompetent to control the acts of this body. Congress, I trust, will never be willing to acknowledge the
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