19 binding force of precedent, in the decision of constitutional questions. Bu sir, admitting, for the sake of argument, precedent to be good authority, what does it prove in this case ? I apprehend that it would rather make against than in favor of a bank. We find, in 1811, when a renewal of the charter granted in 1791 was applied for, that its constitutionality was discussed, and that the application was rejected. And further, when the bank petitioned Congress for time to wind up its affairs, the petition was referred to a committee who reported against the application, urging that it was unconstitutional, and the report was concurred in. In 1813, when the subject of a bank was again before Congress, and while under discussion in the House of Representatives, a distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. Webster,) then a member of the House, declared in his place, while opposing the bank, that the renewal of the bank charter had been refused, because it was unconstitutional; and Congress again decided against a bank. In 1832, the bill to renew the charter granted in 1816 was vetoed by the late President, and subsequently rejected by Congress, both alleging that it was unconstitutional: So that the precedents. so far as the action of Congress is concerned, are equal. If reference be had to the States, we shall find that a large majority of them have been opposed, on constitutional ground, to a United States bank. Whatever authority, therefore, may attach to precedent, makes against a bank. But the Supreme Court has decided that Congress have power to incorporate a bank; and these decisions are appealed to with as much apparent triumph, by the advocates of a national bank, as if the decrees of that court were binding on Congress, and settled the constitutional question forever. Sir, what are we to understand from this? Is it meant to be insinuated that the three departments of Government are not co-ordinate, and that the judiciary is clothed with the exclusive attributes of supremacy ? that neither the Executive nor the Legislative Departments are allowed to judge of their own powers, when acting within their appropriate spheres, and in the discharge of their official duties? Is it intended that the understandings, the oaths, and the consciences of the other two departments, are to be silenced and overawed by the despotic fiat of the bench ? This heretical, servile, and detestable doctrine is industriously propagated, I am aware ; not boldly and openly, but clandestinely and insidiously, by hints, inuendoes, and mysterious givings out. God forbid, patriotism forbid, that it should ever be acknowledged by the Executive or Legislative Departments, or received by the American people. For one, I reject it with disdain. I deny, and defy mortal man to prove, that the decision of the Supreme Court can settle a constitutional question in any other than in a judicial sense. It cannot affect legislation—cannot control the decisions of Congress, or of the Executive—cannot control the sovereign and absolute power of the people, nor of their representatives. It is just as much the province of Congress, or of the Executive, to decide upon the constitutionality of any matter that may properly come before them for their action, as it is for the judiciary when it comes before them for decision. Congress is no more bound by the opinions of the Supreme J udges than are the judges by the opinions of Congress. The constitution vests “ the judicial power in a Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” In all instances, therefore, where suits are prosecuted in the courts of the United States, of which the courts have jurisdiction, and decided by the Sdpieme Court, all such
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