decisions are final. That being the court of the last resort, the parties cannot appeal, but in all cases are bound to abide by such decision. But, as has been before remarked, no decision of the Supreme Court can be obligatory upon either of the other co-ordinate departments. When either is called to the discharge of its appropriate duties, that branch, and not the Supreme Court, is the judge, under the constitution, of its own acts. Nor arc the decisions of the Executive or Legislative Departments binding upon the judges of the Supreme Court, when acting within their appropriate spheres. So long as each of the several departments acts as a check upon the other, there is less danger of the abuse of power—whether springing from ignorance or unlawful ambition. But, it may be asked, how constitutional questions are to be settled in the event of a n on-concurrence of opinion in the co-ordinate departments? I answer—by the people through the ballot boxes. For let it be borne in mind, that this Government is emphatically a Government of the people : it emanates from the people— its powers are granted by the people, and are to be exercised for their benefit ; and, so far at least as the representative department is concerned, in pursuance of their instructions, whenever they may think proper to exercise the right. All the departments of Government, the Executive, the Legislative, and the Judiciary, were established by the people to transact their business, agreeably to the powers bestowed. Consequently, when contradictory opinions are entertained by the several departments, with regard to the extent of their constitutional powers, the people are the only tribunal to which the matter in dispute can be properly referred; and their decision, proclaimed through the ballot box, must be final and conclusive. I am aware, sir, that this doctrine will not be very popular in certain quarters; but I conceive it, nevertheless, to be in accordance with the genius and spirit of our institutions, and maintainable upon strict democratic principles. ft being admitted, then, that the several departments are co-ordinate, and their opinions, therefore, not binding upon each other, it remains to be considered what weight is due to the decisions of the judiciary in favor of the constitutionality of a United States bank? Sir, whatever importance I might be willing to attach to the opinions of such an enlightened tribunal on doubtful and intricate subjects, I am unwilling to concede to them aeon- trolling influence in the decision of a question like the one under discussion, when I am furnished with a written constitution for my guide, and in which every delegated power is distinctly and accurately delineated, both to the natural and the mental eye. Sir, I have examined this instrument intently, anxiously, and, I trust, honestly; but no where do I find in it a power to grant charters of incorporation. Sir, I affirm, and hold that I am able to maintain, in defiance of all the arts of sophistry and mystification, that the convention which framed the constitution did neither grant any express power authorizing Congress to charter a national bank, nor intend that any powrer whatever, whether incidental or otherwise, should be exercised for such purpose. And, further, that the convention positively rejected a direct proposition to empower Congress to incorporate a national bank, and repeatedly rejected written propositions to grant charters of incorporation. But let us first examine for a moment the ground assumed by the judiciary, in arguing the constitutionality of a national bank. By reference to a decision had in the case of McCulloch against the State of Maryland, it will be found that the
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