of this rule reason? An institution (slavery) “extending in its effect” not beyond the slaveholding States, “affecting” no one out of those limits, and in its nature “imposing” no “burdens upon the people,” yet it may “answer” an “end” and a “purpose” for “a set of petitioners to state” the institution “as a grievance to the House.” Again, in the next sentence, “the House of Commons, before they come to a resolution which imposes a tax, cannot but know that it may sensibly affect the commerce or manufacture on which the duty is laid; but they. cannot permit the inconvenience that may possibly be brought upon a particular branch of trade, to weigh with them when put in the balance with those advantages which are intended to result to the whole, and which the public necessities of the state demand from them.” How, in this regard, do the advocates of reception reason here? That Congress cannot but know that slavery, which does not “sensibly affect commerce or manufactures,” nor impair any “particular branch of trade,” yet will permit the fanaticism which alone opposesit “to weigh with them, when put in the balance with those advantages which are intended to result to the whole, and which the public necessities of the state demand of them.” . In other words, the opponents of this rule reason that, in England, although ■ the petitioners are burdened with taxation even to poverty and want, their petitions must be rejected; while in America, where petitioners are burdened with nothing but their own sickly sensibilities, their petitions must be received, notwithstanding they pray for the destruction of a constitution from which they derive unparalleled liberty and happiness. And what is still more strange, the rejection of the- former ‘(according to the position of the gentleman from Massachusetts) is no infringement of the right of petition, while a rejection of the latter is a total annihilation of this great “inherent and inalienable right.” The most objectionable feature of this “odious rule,” (as he is pleased to term it,) the gentleman from Massachusetts thinks, is that which undertakes “to prescribe the subjects upon which the people may or may not petition.” This feature he denounces as being “at war with the constitution, and in opposition to all parliamentary rule.” The rule contended for only prescribes that petitions aimed against the constitution shall not be received. That such a feature is not at war with the constitution, I will soon attempt to show; but at present, while upon parliamentary practice, I would inquire whether such a feature, even to the extent for which the gentleman contends, is “in opposition to air parliamentary rule.” Not to proceed farther, the very parliamentary rule to which I have had occasion to refer provides that petitions against duties shall not be received. Now, I ask the gentleman from Massachusetts whether that7is not an undertaking, on the part of Parliament, “to prescribe the subject upon which the people may or may not petition.” [Here the Speaker announced that the morning hour had expired.] January 30, The report of the Select Committee on the Rules again coming up— Mr.' STILES resumed and concluded his remarks, as follows: _ When I last addressed the House, before concluding-, I had shown, by reference io Hatsell’e parliamentary Precedents that petitions against taxes were rejected by Parliament. Now, sir, as we are referred to England for the rule of our conduct, upon what principle was it that petitions against taxes were always rejected in England ’ It was that taxes were necessary for the support of government. But I ask, sir, if nothing besides taxes are necessary for the. support of government'1 Are not national faith and national honor necessary for the support of government’ Can any government in the world last a moment without them? Can dollars and cents be placed in the scale against faith and honor? Are not the faith and honor of the nation pledged upon the subject of slavery? Would the slaveholding States ever have entered the Union—would our southern fathers ever have signed the constitution, unless their rights had been secured by that instrument’ Will not that Union be dissolved, whenever the government shall, instead of' protecting, plunder them of their property? Yes, sir, slavery and the constitution have flourished together; their existence is the same, and inseparable; and if folly and madness shall destroy the one, the other will follow it to he tomb; But to return to the argument from which I have deviated, to reply to the gentleman from Massachusetts. Parliament, I have shown,- were in the constant practice of rejecting petitions. The intelligent framers of the constitution were familiar with this fact; and in guarding our country against the evils of such legislation as the riot acts, in protecting the great right of petition, their omission .to provide that petitions should be received, is evidence irresistible and conclusive, that the reception of petitions was never intended to be embraced in the amendment, or comprehended under the right of petition. According to the letter of the- constitution, this rule is not a violation of that instrument, because no law is passed, or contemplated. According to its spirit, it is not violated, because the object of the amendment was simply to prevent the passage of such acts as those of George 1st, and Charles 2d; and because the practice of rejecting petitions was common in England, familiar to the authors of the amendment, atid not provided against by them. It is not a violation of the constitution, then. Is it a violation of the right of petition? E ut, instead of searching the constitution, in order o ascertain what are the rights of petition, strange t j tell, we must, as the gentleman from New York says, throw the constitution aside, hnd go back to England, to the British Parliament, to the bill of rights, which grew out of the reyolu-, tion of 1688. A citizen of America, the freest country in the world, (as the gentleman from North Carolina observed;) run away from his own country, and flee to England for his freedom! I leave the gentleman from New York to reconcile himself with the gentleman from North Carolina, his associate in feeling on this subject. I leave him to explain to that member how it is that a citizen of the freest country in the world can throw aside the constitution of his country, and seek a cover for his rights, a shelter for his liberties, behind the acts'of a British Parliament. But why should we go back for instruction to England? as the gentleman from New York said. Is there any analogy between either the government or the people of England and our own? In England all power is in the government. Here it is in the people. There the Parliament, humanly speaking, is omnipotent. Here, our Congress is limited in its powets to a few specified subjects, marked out and
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