defined by a written-constitution. In Great Britain, the sovereign holds his office'independent of the people; and so do the members of the House of Lords. If arbitrary and unjust laws are instituted by the government, the people, however unanimous against them, have no remedy but in an humble petition for their abolition. Here the members of the governrhent are directly responsible to the people, hold their officers subject to the popular will, and, if unfaithful to their trusts, they are turned out, and more faithful servants chosen in their places. It results, therefore, that whilst, in monarchical governments, the right to petition the rulers is the highest, or ultimate right of. the subject in securing him from molestation at the hands of his government, here the right dwindles into comparative insignificance; being only a right to petition our own servants to do that which we may command them to do, or discharge them'for not doing. In short, in England the people are listened to only when they speak in the humble tone of petition. In America they will be heard, through the authoritative voice of instruction. What does this right of petition embrace? What would they have? The right peaceably to assemble. Do we propose, to disturb that right’ No. The right to prepare a petition. Do we propose to prevent them? No. The right to present that petition to this body. Dq we oppose that right’ No, sir, the question has not been fairly met. Gentlemen argue as though we denied the right of petition. We make no such denial. We are as warm advocates of the right of petition as any persons on this floor. We know the importance of that right, and would not touch it. We are willing that gentlemen shall exercise the right to as full an extent, at least, as it is enjoyed in England, (for that seems to be the summit of their ambition;) but we come to issue with them as to the limits and extent of that right. What are the limits and extent of that right’ There must be some point at which the right of petition ends, and that of legislating by this body commences. Where does the right of petition end? Just where that of legislation commences. Legislation cannot go back and interfere with petition; nor can petition extend forward and interfere with legislation. The light of legislation commences the moment the House is informed of the petition. If they have a right to go one step farther, and say we shall receive,* they have just as much right to say we shall refer, and we shall grant. The action of the House —the right of legislation—commences with the presentation of the petition; and the refusal to accept is no interference with that right. We do not propose to interfere with their assembling; we do not dictate the manner in which they shall prepare a petition, or how they should present it to this body. But, when they have assembled; when they have prepared the petition; when they have presented it to this House, when, in short, their right has been fully exercised and completely exhausted,—then it is that our right commences: and, as we have not interfered with them, we should not permit them to interfere with us, to usurp the legislative powers of the country, and dictate to us the mode and manner in which our duties shall be performed. But, (says the gentleman from North Carolina,) the petition should be received, “in order to know what it is the petitioners want.’’ We undertake, (says the member from Maine,) by the . refusal of the petition, “to prejudge the case,” and “condemn them unheard.” Here is another step where gentlemen reason unfairly. They assume, as a starting point upon which to found an argument, that we have never seen, read, or heard the petition, .Now, Sir, if this bet reasoning, gentlemen have forgotten the very first rule in logic. They have failed to prove their premises. Is it true, in point of fact, that we are unac- x quainted with the objects of the petition? Is there a member here who can rise in his place and say that he does “not know what the petitioners want’’’ Have they not been presented beyond number for years past’ Has not Congress heard, considered, discussed, and determined, that they cannot entertain jurisdiction of the subject? And'yet it impairs the great right of petition, it treats the applicant disrespectfully, for Congress, by this rule, to assert that they have heard and determined that they have no jurisdiction over the subject. Will gentlemen inform me upon what principles such an answer— the judgment of the House as to its jurisdiction (for' that is the whole sum and substance of the rule)— ’ can be construed into disrespect towards the petitioners? Let gentlemen consider such conduct, if it had occurred in private instead of public life. An individual presents you with a petition to-day, and you in-- form him that you have no power to grant his prayer; to-morrdw he renews his application, and receives the same answer; but, not satisfied with refusal after refusal, he continues to harass you with his applications, until, at length, worn out by his importunities, you adopt a rule that you will not, in future, receive his applications; will any one, the most fastidious, say that the adoption of such a rule is treating the petitioner with- disrespect’ But step above the walks of private life, and enter the places of power: and is the principle- of action changed? Visit your courts of law: you find a plaintiff has brought an action for an amount, or of a nature, beyond or out of thejurisdiction of the court. A plea is filed: what is the reply of the judge? The court has no jurisdiction of the case. Has such an answer ever been considered as disrespectful? Go still higher: enter the courts of chancery. A complainant has filed a bill which, taking every word of it to be true, presents no case for relief; a demurrer is offered by the defendant, which, admitting all that the bill alleges, denies his right to come into court; and the chancellor sustaining - the demurrer, dismisses the complainant without proof or inquiry. ‘ Has such a course ever been deemed as wanting m respect? and is the legislative power of the country to be stripped of a like authority? This rule is in the nature of a simple plea to the jurisdiction or demurrer in chancery;- and can no more be coupled with disrespect than either of those modes of judicial proceeding. But “we prejudge the case.” “We condemn them unheard.” What do gentlemen mean? Am I to understand that the petitions have never been read? They have been read over and over again, whilst before the question of reception is put, the-, petition can always be read upon the call of any, member of the House. Is it meant, by not being'* heard, that these petitions have never been discussed? They have been discussed in this hall to. the fullest extent for weeks, and even months, whilst the question of reception not only admit discussion, but admits it in the most ample manner. .Gentlemen argue as though we had no right, for any cause, or under any circumstances, to reject a petition. Is the right illimitable? : Are there no'
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