5 ■bounds to its exercise? If so, we might as well stop guaranties the existence of slavery, Both rights , business. -If the indefinable grievances of every _ ’ ---- ------------ J 1— ----- 1 *’— 'man, woman, and child—white, black, or parti-’ colored, throughout our widely extended country, whose digestive organs may have become impaired, -and who has therefore “the thousand ills that flesh is are equally' secured by the same high authority. Can one portion of the constitution be used to destroy another? Could the framers of the constitution have been guilty of such an absurdity as to have given the people a right to petition against the instrument which they had formed for their welfare and happiness? Can they be chargeable with the folly of creating and sanctioning a grievance, when they have conferred the right of petitioning against such evils? In short, can anything in the constitution be considered such a grievance as the people are allowed to petition against? No, sir: by no sane and unprejudiced man can the existence of slavery be considered a grievance in the contemplation of the constitution. But again. Whose grievances does the constitution contemplate should be the subject of petition?- Certainly those of the petitioners—the grievances of the petitioners themselves, and not those of any other body or person. Will any gentleman on this? floor attempt to show how slavery at the South is a grievance to the people of the -North. How,can. hey ask us to consider as a grievance that which., those who are alone concerned neither know nor acknowledge? There are those, doubtless, at the North, if not in this hall, who look upon slavery in the abstract as an evil; but is it therefore a grievance? I call upon any constitutional lawyer on this- floor, and more especially the strict constructionist, to say’that it is such a grievance as was contem-’ plated by the authors of the 1st amendment of the constitution, . . 2. The power of the government over the subject of the petition. What is the object which petitioners profess to have in view in the presentation of petitions? What is the end to be attained, and upon which Congress can alone recognise their right of application? It is redress. And a grievance which Congress has no right to redress, they have no right to petition against; because grievances which Congress can redress are the grievances, and the only grievances, contemplated, in the amendment. Now, if there is a single constitutional principle which, more than any other, may be considered as settled beyond the possibilty of dispute, it is that the institution of slavery is municipal, not national. It belongs exclv sively to the States, and can only be effected by State legislation. This domestic institution of the South is her own. It was brought into the Union with her; secured by the compact which makes us one people; and he who looks upon it as a grievance is an enemy to the constitution, and opposed to the peace and prosperity of our common country. I have thus attempted to show that slavery is not a grievance. If it were a grievance at all, it is not one affecting the people of the North; and that, if it were a grievance affecting the people of the North, it is not one which can be redressed by the government; and therefore no one has a constitutional right, to petition for its abolition. A petition to any person or authority presupposes the power of relief. A right of petition cannot exist where there is no duty- to hear the complaint; and the duty to hear cannot exist without a comment urat 3 power to redress. There is, then, no duty to receive a petition upon which Congress has indisputably no power to act; and the refusal to receive such petition cannot be. tortured into a violation of the right to send it, which never existed. 'heir to,” to complain of; if the conceits of every fanatic or fool, when embodied in the form of a petition, are entitled, on that account alone, to consid- sideration and respect—we might devote our whole time of legislation to petitions alone; we might remain here from one year’s end to another; we might sit from morn to night, and night to morn, and. pur labors would never know an end; The right illimitable? Is every petition, however disrespectful to this body, to be received? Is there any one who, in his zeal for the freedom of petition, goes that far? I presume not. There is, then, some limit to that right. We have the power to reject; the right to refuse is conceded. And is not this rejection an abridgment of the great right of petition? Oh no! And why? Because it would be an interference with the dignity of our honorable selves, . and be perhaps an interruption of the business of this House. This great inherent and inalienable right cannot stand, then, when brought into contact with our dignity or our business. These are to be rejected; but all others are to be received. These petitions may be as disrespectful as their authors please, to our constituents or our States; but so as “they do not touch our noble selves, they are to be received. They may treat with contempt the constitution of the country, and trample on its chartered rights; but so as they do not impede our business here, they are to be received. From whence did we -obtain our dignity? Are we in a monarchical government, and was it born with us? No, sir. It was derived from the people; yet we would reject a petition here, disrespectful to ourselves, who are the ■servants; but receive one insulting to, and defamatory of, the people, who are the masters. Whence do we derive our powers of legislation? From the -constitution; and we would reject a petition impeding our legislation, and yet receive one viola- rive of the constitution, front whence all our powers •of legislation are derived, an’d upon which the welfare of the country depends. The right illimitable? Then where the necessity of that rule of this House which makes it incumbent on the introducer to give a statement of the contents of the petition? Where the necessityof a statement, unless its object be to determine whether or not Congress has jurisdiction over the subject. If there be no discretion, where the necessity of that other rule which requires the question of reception to be put. Where the necessity of a question at all, if we are prohibited from voting, or answering in the negative? The right of petition involves two considerations: 1st. The right of the citizen aggrieved to petition: 2d. The power of the government over the subject of the petition. 1. Then the citizen must be aggrieved, before he can petition. The only petitions excluded by this rule are those upon the subject of slavery. Is a majority of this House prepared to pronounce slavery a grievance? Can an institution recognised and secured by the constitution be a grievance? Are they prepared to pronounce the constitution (for it is the constitution) a grievance? Was it the intention of the constitution to entail grievances on the people? The same constitution which guaranties the right of petition
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