6 sarily arise in meeting the question upon which gentlemen have laid most stress in the debate—viz: an abridgment of the petition: but, as the opinion is asserted with so much confidence, and in such wild terms, I will throw out a few difficulties in the way, which have occurred to my mind, and which I think are calculated to stagger any reflecting man. “Congress may pay the master or not, but it can take compulsorily the slave from him;” and the only authority for this sweeping and despotic declaration is simply that clause which gives to Congress “exclusive legislation” over the District. Sir, did the cessions by Virginia and Maryland of portions of their respective territory to Congress to constitute the District, remove the inhabitants of those portions beyond the guaranties of the constitution? Clearly not. How, then, does the gentleman propose to get rid of that portion of the 5th amendment of the constitution, which provides that “no person shall be deprived of life,'liberty, or property, without due- process of law; and that private property shall not be taken for public use without due compensation?” That the legislation of this hall is not a “process of law” will not be disputed, and it is equally clear that slaves are “property;” they are recognised as property by the constitution, claimed as property by our treaties with foreign powers, and considered as- property by our acts of legislation. Again “private property shall not be taken (except) for public use.’*' It would be somewhat difficult, I apprehend, to establish that the emancipation of the slaves of thia District would be for the “public use,” and benefit; and should they be so considered, could they be taken “compulsorily” from the master “with or without paying” him, as the gentleman from New York says? No, sir, not “without due compensation.” And when the member has disposed of these, difficulties, under what clause of the constitution will he derive funds to be appropriated to such an object? We are told that “Congress has exclusive legislaj| tion over” the “District;” but does “exclusive” mean unlimited—“absolute?” as the gentleman from Ma’s- sachusetts, [Mr. Hudson] says? From what dictionary or other source did he learn that “exclusive” meant “absolute?” And yet it must not only signify absolute, but also despotic power, or the • position of the gentleman from New York falls to the ground. But how will any reasonable man (not to take a constitutional lawyer) construe that clause? It means, and can be made to signify nothing more than a grant of legislative power over the District to the exclusion, “in all cases whatsoever,” of any concurrent jurisdiction. If this most palpable construction needed support, the history of the clause would amply furnish it. That clause of the 8th section of the 1 st article was not comprised in the original draft of the constitution, but it was after- wards supplied, when its necessity became apparent, from the circumstances which occurred during the latter part of the revolutionary war, when the proceedings of Congress were disturbed by a turbulent, mob, which the police of Philadelphia being unable to subdue, compelled that body to remove its sittings to Trenton, New Jersey. That power was conferred for the single purpose of enabling Congress to protect its members from insult and violence, and to conduct, without interruption, the deliberations of this country. From whence did Congress derive its powers of legislation over this District’ From the constitution, together with the “cessions of particular States.” Could the cessions of territory by particular States have enlarged the powers of Con— Many points have been made on this question ■which I could have desired an opportunity to have met, but which, under the operation of the hour rule, I am reluctantly constrained to omit. Were it not for this abridgment of my great inherent and inalienable right, “freedom of speech” and of debate, I should have made it my duty to have replied to every suggestion which has been advanced; for there is not one, which I have heard, which could not, in my opinion, have been easily and triumphantly answered. But although deprived of this great right, I shall not, like some gentlemen on this floor, flee to England for my right; or, like others, speak of dissolving the Union. I will not even waste my important time in the indulgence of complaint, but with all possible despatch proceed to answer such as I conceive the most important suggestions. It is said on this floor, “let the petitions be received, and they will vote with us for their rejection immediately after reception.” To such I say, there is one point in which we agree; and that the most important of the whole matter. It is in the refusal or denial of the prayer of the petition. Reception is all that divides us. But I ask, does not reception carry with it jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the petition? Does not reception carry the implication, inevitably, that the petition may or may not be granted? Reception either carries the implication, or it does not. The proposition must be answered affirmatively or negatively. If it be answered affirm- atively, if the reception carries jurisdiction over the subject of slavery, if it carries the implication that the prayer for its abolition may or may not be granted, are they willing to stand forth as the advocates of reception? Clearly not; because, in the outset, they agree that the prayer could not be granted, because, if Congress would, she has not the power to grant it. If, then, reception carries jurisdiction, they aye opposed to it. If, on the other hand, the proposition be answered negatively, if reception does not carry jurisdiction and the implication that the prayer may or may not be granted, where is the use of it? Where the difference between reception, and instant rejection after it is received? What is to be gained by reception? Is it any advantage to the petitioner that his prayer is rejected immediately after, instead of immediately before, reception. How does the simple, naked vote of reception benefit him? The' prayer of a petition is its vital part; take away the prayer, and you deprive it of all vitality—make it a dead letter. If, therefore, we reject the prayer, do we not reject the petition? The distinction is too refined and abstract for a question of such universal and vital importance. It is but a dispute about terms, and wholly overlooks the substance. It is at first and at last a rejection of the prayer of the petition; but a refusal of the petition is a rejection in a mode to save time and money, put an end to such applications, and prevent discussions dangerous to the Union. The gentleman from New York has admitted that when petitions asked Congress to interfere between master and slave in the States, they stood on ground prohibited by the constitution; but went on to argue that petitions should be received when they asked an abolition of slavery in the District, because “Congress had full power to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia.” “They may pay the master or not, but they can take the slave compulsorily from him.” I have not the time, if I possessed the inclination, to argue this point. It does not neces
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