gress under the constitution? Surely not. How then can she now presume to abolish slavery? The power of Congress over the subject of slavery is fixed by the constitution. It has no power whatever over the subject, and cannot touch it, whether the slave be found upon the soil of a State, or that of the District of Columbia. From what States was the “ten miles square,” which now constitutes the “seat of government,” derived? Virginia and Maryland. It is a self-evident proposition, as well as an es- ■ ablished principle of law, that a grantee can acquire no more power than a grantor could convey. The States of Virginia and Maryland themselves, it cannot be disputed, could not have liberated, without the consent of their owners, the slaves of this District, when the territory was parts of their respective States. And how then can Congress, deriving her power from them, claim or exercise more power than the States which ceded the territory ever possessed? But those States, unwilling to rely upon the general principle just alluded to, and apprehending the very danger which now threatens the rights of the inhabitants of this District, prudently inserted in their acts of cession the following limit to the exercise of power by Congress over the District: “Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to vest in the United States any right ..of property in the soil, or to affect the rights of individuals therein, otherwise than the same shall or may be transferred by such individuals to the United States.” But there are other principles which should govern legislators in this matter—principles of higher authority and obligation than even those of the law and constitution. I mean the great principles of justice and moral right. Would the States of Virginia and Maryland ever, have consented to relinquish portions of their territory for such purposes as those for which gentlemen now contend? Would the independent citizens of “free and independent States” ever have agreed to have exchanged a legislation over their personal rights, by representatives chosen by, and responsible to them, for the exclusive legislation of a Congress irresponsible to them, if they had supposed that such jurisdiction was to be unlimited, “absolute," and liable to be directed by the petitions of others, who had neither a common residence nor a common interest with them? Does any one believe that, if the federal government had intimated an intention to abolish slavery in the District, the States of Virginia and Maryland would ever have ceded their territory? And is not such an attempt now in bad faith, against the spirit of the compact, .and a gross violation of the understanding which must have subsisted between the parties to the cession? But, if I were disposed to argue this point, I should need nothing more than the admission of the gentleman from New York, that “Congress cannot interfere with slavery in the States.” Will not the abolition of slavery in this District be an interference with slavery in the States? Not to take into consideration the real object which the abolitionists have in view, in their designs upon this District, as but an entering-wedge for the abolition of slavery throughout the States, as but the commencement of an enterprise which will terminate only with entire emancipation,—not, I say, to consider these objects, will it not “interfere with slavery in the States” to abolish here? Will it not inevitably produce discontent and rebellion among the blacks of the neighbor* ing States, and make this District a den of fugitive slaves? Yes, sir, the truth cannot be suppressed, that if slavery is touched here, a blow will be struck which will be felt throughout the length and breadth of the slave-holding States. These suggestions, thrown out for the consideration of others, are but some of the difficulties which have presented themselves to my mind, in the way of any exercise of power over the subject of slavery in this District; and I humbly ask that, if they are not of sufficient weight to convince us of our want of power over the subject, whether they are not calculated at least to create doubts as to its possession? And what, under such circumstances, has been held the safe and unerring guide for the conduct of the legislator? It is, that if there be doubt as to the power, it should not be exercised. Quod dubitas ne feceris. ■ What you doubt, that you may not do. The possession of power should be untrammelled by a single doubt, or you should not attempt its exercise. But (says the member from Maine, and it is reiterated by the gentleman from New York and others) separate the right of petition from abolition, and “see how we will come up to the mark; how we will sustain our obligations to the Union.” Sir, the right of petition and abolition ought never to have been blended. -To connect them is a mere trick—an artful scheme to excite the sympathies and delude the judgments of this legislative body. And who, pray, are the authors of this base trick? Who the projectors of this artful scheme. Who connected the right of petition with abolition? Are we at the South, the slaveholding community, subject to the charge? It will not be pretended. It will not be presumed for a moment that we would throw any obstacles in the way, and create interference with the maintenance of our just and constitutional rights. Are our friends of the North, the anti-abolitionists, chargeable? Surely not. They deprecate the difficulty; they pray deliverance from the embarrassment; and we have no reason to question their sincerity. If neither the South nor those opposed to abolition in the North, are the authors of this scheme, who are? There is but one other party in the country upon this subject, and it results inevitably that they are its authors—viz: the abolitionists themselves. I appeal to our intelligent and reflectingfriends from the North—I put it to them, whether they will suffer themselves to be'5 thus entrapped; caught in the snare set for- them by these fanatics; deluded by this miserable subterfuge, the pitiful cry of the violation of the right of petition. But it has already been hinted, and I may be answered, that though this may be but a trick, yet the abolitionists have so fully succeeded in poisoning the minds of our constituents, so thoroughly and extensively have they persuaded them that the non-reception of their petitions is a violation of their unalienable rights, that unless we carry out their views, the relation between us, of representative and constituents, will be dissolved. Sir, such a suggestion scarcely deserves a passing notice. Any man who legislates here with a view to get back into this hall, will of course riot be guided by reason. Such a member is unworthy of his station, because he legislates for himself, and. not for his country. Their constituents think the iSight of petition abridged, when we are daily receiving petition® without objection, over which Congress has jurisdiction, and reject only those over which Congres® has no control. Cannot they understand the diffe
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