12 History has determined the character of the parties in that momentous , contest. “ The first war of the French Revolution,” says Wheaton, in his History of the Law of Nations, “originated in the application by the Allied Powers: of the principle of armed intervention to the internal affairs of France, for- the purpose of checking the progress of her revolutionary principles and the extension of her military power.” War was declared, indeed, by France, but only as a reply to the ultimatum of a Restoration of Despotism) tendered by the Armed League of Enemies. Thus, sir, we have arrived at the true ground of defence of the neutrality of 1793, to wit: that performance of the treaty was impossible. Sir, in a practical sense, performance was impossible. First, on account . of the condition of France. The parties in 1778 of course expected that. France would remain an organized State, capable of conducting combined operations under the treaty, upon a method and towards an end, without. danger from herself to her ally. But it was not so with France. She became not merely revolutionary, but disorganized, having no cettain and: permanent head, no stable and effective legislature. All the organs of the State were shattered broken, and scattered. “ Nee color imperii, nec frons erat ulla Senaius.” The King, after unavailing changes of ministry, convened the Assembly of the Notables. After holding the bed of justice, and after attempting to establish the new plenary courts, he called the States General, which soon became a Constituent Assembly, absorbing all the functions of government. Suddenly the People of Paris rose, and brought the King, Queen, and Assembly, into captivity. A constitutional monarchy rose under the dictation of the People ; but the King was degraded, condemned, and executed, and a Republic appeared. The Republic went down before the power of’ cabals, which rapidly succeeded each other, all sustaining their administrations, throughout a reign of terror, by the tribunal of blood. These unnatural convulsions could have but one end—the restoration of the State by a Dictator. That magistrate, in 1800, appeared in the person of Napoleon. When and where, before that event, could the United States have been required to go to the aid of France ? It was well that France had regained her liberty ; but her ally had a right, before going into a war with her against Europe, to see that liberty combined with government and with< public force—with national morality, with social order, and with civil man- - ners. All this was wisely deemed by Washington necessary to secure the United States against absolute danger, and to render their alliance at all useful to France. For, on what side were the United States to array themselves ? With the King while he yet held the reins of state, or with the National Assembly while abolishing the monarchy? With the ephemeral Directories, which governed France through the guillotine, or with the Counter-Revolutionists, struggling to restore internal peace and repose r Well did Mr. Jefferson say, that if the United States had panted for war as much as ancient Rome—if their armies had been as effective as those of Prussia—if their coffers had been full and their debts annihilated—even then, peace was too precious to be put at hazard, in an enterprise with an ally thus deranged and disorganized. And what was the condition of the United States, that they should periH all in the domestic rage of France and her foreign strife?. Mr. Jefferson^ was no false interpreter, and he thus describedit. “An infant country,, deep in debt, necessitated to borrow in Europe—without a land or naval*, force—without a competency of arms and ammunition—with a commerce: connected beyond the Atlantic—with the certainty of enhancing the price?
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