THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 27 always admired, disdained these accusations, and made no reply. He satisfied himself with pursuing his preparations in laborious silence. But the moment came in which, notwithstanding the loyal support given him by the President, that functionary could no longer resist the tempest. A council of war of all the divisional generals was held; a plan of campaign, not that of McClellan, was proposed and discussed. McClellan was then forced to explain his projects, and the next day they were known to the enemy. Informed no doubt by one of those thousand female spies who keep up bis communications into the domestic circles of the federal enemy, Johnston evacuated Manassas at once. This was a skillful manoeuvre. Incapable of assuming the offensive; threatened with attack either at Centreville, where defence would be useless if successful, or at Richmond, the loss M which would be a grave check, and unable to cover both positions at once, Johnston threw his whole force before the latter of the two. For the Army of the Potomac this was a misfortune. Its movement was unmasked before it had been made. Part of its transports were still frozen up in the Hudson. Such being the state of affairs, was it proper to execute as rapidly as possible the movement upon Richmond by water, or to march upon Richmond by land? Such was the grave question to be settled by the young general in a miserable room of an abandoned house at Fairfax within twenty-four hours. And it was at this moment that the news of his removal as general-inchief reached him ; the news, that is, that he could no longer count noon the co-operation of the other armies of the Union, and that the troops under his own orders were to be divided into four grand corps under four separate chiefs named in order of rank; a change which would throw into subaltern positions some young generals of division who had his personal confidence. It is easy to see that here was matter enough to
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