THE ARMA OF THE POTOMAC. 29 monel there were viaducts which it would have required six weeks to reconstruct. The land march was therefore abandoned and we came back to the movement by water. But this operation also was no longer what it had been when McClellan had conceived it. The revelation of his plans to the enemy had allowed the latter to take his precautions. The evacuation of Manassas had preceded instead of following the opening of the federal campaign. The movement by water could no longer be a surprise. Unfortunately it was now also to lose the advantages of a rapid execution. A few days had been half lost in a useless pursuit of the enemy while the transports were assembling at Alexandria. At last they were assembled and the order came to embark. But here a new misunderstanding awaited the General. He had been promised transports which could convey 50,000 men at a time. He found vessels hardly equal to the conveyance of half that number. Instead of moving at once, aS McClellan had intended, a whole army with its equipage, a number of trips had to be made. The embarkation began March 17. The force consisted of eleven divisions of infantry, 8,000 to 10,000 strong; one division of regulars (inf. and cav.) 6,000 strong ; 350 pieces of artillery. The total effective force may have been 120,000 men. At the moment of departure a whole division was detached to form, we know not why, an independent command under General Fremont in the mountains of Virginia. We shall see the Potomac army successively undergo other not less inexplicable diminutions. But we anticipate. A fortnight was required to move the army to Fortress Monroe. This point was chosen because the apparition of the Merrimac, and her tremendous exhibition of her strength, had made it impossible to regard the federal navy as absolutely mistress of the waters of Virginia.
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