• 30 the clause on the apportionment of Representatives, was struck out, and the word “ service ” substituted instead. This final exclusion from the Constitution of the idea of property in man was on the motion of Mr. Randolph, of Virginia ; and the reason assigned for the substitution, according to Mr. Madison, in his authentic report of the debate, was, that the former was thought to express the condition of slaves, and the latter the obligations of free persons.” Thus, at every point, by great national declarations, by frank utterances in the Convention, and by a positive act in adjusting the text of the Constitution, was the idea of property in man unequivocally rejected. This pretension, which may be dismissed as utterly baseless, becomes absurd when it is considered to what result it necessarily conducts. If the Barbarism of Slavery, in all its five-fold wrong, is really embodied in the Constitution, so as to be beyond the reach of prohibition, either Congressional; or local, in the Territories, then, for the same reason, it must be beyond the reach of prohibition or abolition, even by local authority in the States themselves, and, just so long as the Constitution continues unchanged, Territories and States alike must be open to all its blasting influences. And yet this pretension, which, in its natural consequences, overturns State Rights, is put forward by Senators, who profess to be the special guardians of State Rights. Nor does this pretension derive any support from the much-debated clause in the Constitution for the rendition of fugitives from 11 service or labor,” on which so much stress is constantly put. But I do not occupy your time now on this head, for two reasons—first, because, having already on a former occasion exhibited with great fullness the character of that clause, I am unwilling now thus incidentally to open the question upon it; and secondly, because, whatever may be its character—admitting that it confers power upon Congress—and admitting also, what is often denied, that, in defiance of commanding rules of interpretation, the equivocal words there employed have that “ irresistible clearness ” which is necessary in taking away Human Rights—yet nothing can be clearer than that the fugitives, whosoever they may be, are regarded under the Constitution as persons, and not as property. I disdain to dwell on that other argument, brought forward by Senators, who, denying the Equality of Man, speciously assert the Equality of the States ; and from this principle, true in many respects, jump to the conclusion, that Slave-masters are entitled, in the name of Equality, to take their slaves into the National Territories, under the solemn safeguards of the Constitution. But this argument comes back to the first pretension, that slaves are recognised as “ property ” in the Constitution, To that pretension, already amply exposed, ,we are always brought, nor can any sounding allegations of State Equality avoid it. And yet, this very argument betrays the inconsistency of its authors. If persons held to service in the Slave States are 11 property ” under the Constitution, then, under the provision—known as the “three-fifths” rule—which founds representation in the other House on such persons, there is a property representation from the Slave States, with voice and vote, while there is no such property representation from the Free States. With glaring inequality, the representation of Slave States is founded first on “persons,” and secondly on a large part of their pretended property; wr ile the representation of the Free States is founded simply on “ persons,” leaving all their boundless millions of property unrepresented. Thus, whichever way we approach it, the absurdity of this pretension becomes manifest. Assuming the pretension of property in man under the Constitution, you slap in the face the whole theory of State Equality, for you disclose a gigantic inequality between the Slave States and the Free States; and assuming the Equality of States, in the House of Representatives as elsewhere, you slap in the face the whole pretension of property in man under the Constitution. I disdain to dwell also on that other argument, which, in the name of Popular Sovereignty, undertakes to secure to the people in the Territories the wicked power—sometimes called, by confusion of terms, right—to enslave their fellow-men; as if this pretension was not blasted at once by the Declaration of Independence, when it announced that “all governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed,” and as if anywhere within the jurisdiction of the Constitution, which contains no sentence, phrase, or word, sanctioning this outrage, and which carefully excludes the idea of property in man, while it surrounds all persons with the highest safeguards of a citizen, such pretension could exist. Whatever it may be elsewhere, Popular Sovereignty within the sphere of the Constitution has its limitations. Claiming for all the largest liberty of a true Civilization, it compresses all within the constraints of Justice ; nor does it allow any man to assert a right to do what he pleases, except when he pleases to do right. As well within the Territories attempt to make a King as attempt to make a slave. But this pretension—rejected alike by every Slave-master and by every lover of Freedom— Where I behold a factious band agree To call it freedom when themselves are free, proceeding originally from a vain effort to avoid the impending question between Freedom and Slavery—assuming a delusive phrase of Freedom as a cloak for Slavery—speaking with the voice of Jacob while its hands are the hands of Esau—and, by its plausible nick-name, enabling politicians sometimes to deceive the public and sometimes even to deceive them
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