Bioethics in Faith and Practice, Volume 4, Number 1

13 Bioethics in Faith and Practice ⦁ 2019 ⦁ Volume 4 ⦁ Number 1 described above. This practice raises many significant ethical issues that have contributed to the abortion debate, still controversial in the U.S. nearly half a century after Roe vs. Wade . Defining what makes a person a person has been the central question of bioethics since the discipline’s beginning. In particular, the grey areas around birth and death have been the subject of both medical inquiry and philosophical contemplation. The definitive moment when a new person comes into existence has been argued to take place at conception, implantation, the point of brain development, the point at which the fetus can feel pain, the point at which the fetus would be viable outside the womb, and birth. Marking that moment requires a sufficient definition of what qualities and/or capacities it is, exactly, that make a living thing a person. The state of New York decided this year that a baby is a person only if his/her mother wanted him/her to exist, repealing any protection for babies born alive after an abortion attempt This implicitly affirmed a relational view of personhood, recognizing the humanity of the baby only if he/she is loved or wanted by someone else. While many celebrated the passing of this law, many others, including some who support abortion in other cases, mourned this legalization of infanticide. Others, such as the utilitarian philosopher Peter Singer, 27 try to place personhood on a spectrum, often based on qualities such as intelligence, moral reasoning, consciousness, and/or self-awareness. This is troubling, however, since this definition necessitates that one adult human may be more of a “person” than another. Taken to Singer’s extremes, some animals may be classified as more valuable than some children and mentally disabled people. Attempts to mark the beginning of personhood as it relates to the human embryo face the challenge that while personhood should not be defined as a spectrum, development necessarily is. The brain develops over a period of time; sensitivity to pain likewise changes; viability is constantly being altered by changes in medical technology, while even a baby who is born alive is not viable without care. Implantation and conception are the only two clearly distinguishable markers that don’t constitute moving targets, and seem the only biologically defensible moral positions. Of the two, I tend to favor conception as the most likely moment for the creation of a new person for two reasons. First, when considering decisions such as selective embryo transfer or abortion, the outcome is one of two ethical extremes: it is either morally permissible or it is murder. Since the potential harm if we choose incorrectly is so vast, I consider the morally right decision to be the more conservative one. Second, implantation is a change in location from the fallopian tubes to the wall of the uterus, while conception is a change in being (from two haploid, end-stage gametes to a new, genetically unique diploid cell). Conception is the point at which a new member of the human species is created, and I think that while the concepts of a person and a genetic human are not necessarily identical, the two concepts can generally be treated as united for practical purposes. While neither the implantation nor the conception view allows for traditional abortions, the distinction is significant when it comes to IVF. Discarded embryos are past the point of conception, but have not yet been implanted. As we move on to address other ethical issues surrounding IVF, it is crucial to remember that it is not only the interests of the infertile couple but also their created children that are at stake. 27 John Hymers, "Not a Modest Proposal: Peter Singer and the Definition of Person," Ethical Perspectives 6 (1999), 126-138.