Channels, Fall 2016

Channels • 2016 • Volume 1 • Number 1 Page 1 Emotions and the Divine Nature: Impassibility in the Greek Apologists and Irenaeus J. Caleb Little Biblical and Theological Studies — Cedarville University Introduction n current theological discussions, divine impassibility has been cast into disrepute. One only needs to look at the work of Jürgen Moltmann or Jung Young Lee to find some of the reasons for this disenchantment. An impassible God is considered to be cold, static, impersonal, and incapable of being the loving God that the Scriptures describe and that humans so desperately need. 1 Lee exemplifies this perspective in his book God Suffers For Us by arguing that a loving God must be able to empathize with his people and that God cannot empathize without suffering and emotions. Other scholars, such as Bertrand Brasnett in his book The Suffering of the Impassible God, have attempted to maintain some small elements of divine impassibility while allowing for strong statements of emotion and suffering. Some of these theologians have buttressed their skepticism of divine impassibility by casting doubt upon the origin of the doctrine. These scholars recognize that this attribute was ascribed to God at a very early stage in Christian theology. However, scholars have a general tendency to blame the adoption of divine impassibility upon undue deference to Hellenistic philosophy. Robert M. Grant, while more nuanced than many contemporary theologians, reflects this assessment in The Early Christian Doctrines of God . After briefly outlining some of the patristic claims of the subject and then noting possible philosophical influences upon the doctrine of divine impassibility, Grant concludes that the, “philosophical atmosphere undoubtedly did early Christian theology no good.” 2 I hold that this interpretation of divine impassibility is a misunderstanding of what the early Christian theologians meant when they ascribed impassibility to God. 3 Divine impassibility was not a claim that God is a static being with no interest in his creation. Rather, the early Greek fathers used divine impassibility as an apophatic qualifier tied to 1 See Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom, 21-25 for a classic example of this argument. 2 Grant, The Early Christian Doctrine of God, 113-114. The development of this perspective is complicated and part of a larger suspicion of Hellenistic influences upon patristic thought that stretches back at least to the work of Adolf von Harnack. 3 It is of course important to note that this rejection of divine impassibility is not unanimous. Scholars such as Weinandy, Gavrilyuk, and Castelo (all referenced elsewhere in this work) have all made arguments for some form of impassibility much more closely akin to the classical model. Creel has attempted to do this as well in Divine Impassibility from the perspective of analytical philosophy. I