Channels, Fall 2016

Page 4 Dotson • The Successes and Failures of the Battle of Mogadishu compound,” according to a September 13 th New York Times article. 8 Not only had fighting erupted between TFR and the militias almost immediately upon their arrival, but the Battle of Mogadishu was also not the first time a UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter had been shot down by the rebel groups. Stated in a second September New York Times article, “three Americans were killed early [September 25 th ] when Somali gunmen hit an American Blackhawk helicopter with a rocket-propelled grenade.” 9 This event marked the first UH-60 to actually go down over Somali airspace. Three major issues existed that, despite the mission still being a success, plagued it before it even started. First, Somali morale was at a high leading up to the Battle of Mogadishu because of the repeated barrages against American and UN operations, chiefly the destruction of the Blackhawk. This made the daunting task of the battle painfully obvious. Second, the greatest hindrance came from the task force’s own government. Leading up to the battle in the summer months of 1993, the Somalis had greatly exaggerated the number of civilian casualties in the failed attempts to capture General Aidid. This, along with pressure from foreign political forces, had caused the Clinton Administration to cave in on their support for using mass casualty producing weapons in a reduction of the rules of engagement (ROE), something that TFR desperately needed. General Garrison had requested AC-130 gunships and M1 tanks from the administration due to the seriousness of the mission, but they were both denied him based on this new ROE. When the thirty- minute mission turned into an overnight fiasco, these weapons could have been the difference between life and death. The third and final issue came from General Garrison himself. General Garrison had posted a twenty-five thousand dollar reward for information on the location of General Aidid. Instead of helping Garrison, however, the reward ended up working against him. The painfully small amount of reward money led many people in Mogadishu to believe that the Americans were saying Aidid and the entire Somali populace were not worth anything. Major Roger Sangvic, an analyst for the United States Army, remarked about the reward in his paper, saying, “In retrospect, the reward had the opposite effect to that which it was intended to have. SNA members considered the UN reward an insult because it was so small. The reward reinforced what Aidid told his clan members: the UN was interfering in Somalia’s internal struggle. Instead of weakening Aidid, the small reward further unified support for Aidid.” 10 Despite the issues plaguing the mission before it even began, TFR was still given the green light to conduct a raid under the codename Operation Gothic Serpent. The object was to 8 “Militias and U.N. Troops Fight in Mogadishu,” New York Times , September 13, 1993, http://www.nytimes.com/1993/09/13/world/militias-and-un-troops-fight-in-mogadishu.html 9 “3 Killed as U.S. Chopper Is Shot Down in Somalia,” New York Times , September 25, 1993, http://www.nytimes.com/1993/09/25/world/3-killed-as-us-chopper-is-shot-down-in-somalia.html 10 R Sangvic, The Battle of Mogadishu: Anatomy of a Failure (Fort Leavenworth, 1998) p.9.