Channels, Fall 2016

Channels • 2016 • Volume 1 • Number 1 Page 7 taken into custody during the United Nations operation.” 16 Ignoring the statistics proving that the actual objective of the mission was completed, many military and historical figures have still argued the battle as a failure, almost always based on moral and ethical repercussions as opposed to the actual military outcome. The loss of life, especially the amount lost in a short sixteen-hour battle, could never be perceived as a victory. When analyzing a military feat, however, the success must also be analyzed in militaristic terms, something the critics of the battle failed to do. One of the more outspoken critics of the battle, United States Army Major Sangvic, in his paper Battle of Mogadishu: Anatomy of a Failure , based his entire thesis on describing the battle as “the failed U.S.-led effort to capture the Somali warlord, Mohammed Farah Aidid, on 3-4 October 1993.” In reality, however, he could not have been farther from the truth; he completely misrepresented the facts. Although Operation Restore Hope, the overarching operation for the UN forces in Somalia, was primarily focused on stopping General Aidid, Operation Gothic Serpent, the Battle of Mogadishu, was only focused on capturing Aidid’s lieutenants and was never directly about capturing him. Mark Bowden, author of Black Hawk Down and the largest public compilation of data on the battle, said this about it: “In strictly military terms, Mogadishu was a success . ” 17 This directly focused on TFR’s completion of the actual mission, something that Major Sangvic failed to grasp: TFR captured the two key leaders of the militia. After the fifteen-hour fight between TFR and the whole of Mogadishu, TFR still managed to capture both of Aidid’s lieutenants despite brandishing an over fifty-percent casualty rate. Eighteen American soldiers were killed, including the two Delta Force members who “gave their lives saving the injured pilot” 18 of Super Six Four , and another seventy-three were wounded. There were, however, several negative political repercussions. After the disastrous attack, President Clinton, in his address on Somalia, stated that “all American troops [would] be out of Somalia no later than March the 31st.” 19 As a result, American forces were pulled out of Somalia. The chaos and starvation resumed almost immediately because, “following the failure of Operation Restore Hope, the whole country, including Mogadishu, came under the authority of competing warlords.” 20 After the U.S. troop’s withdrawal, the remaining UN troops were too small to handle the vast challenges that 16 J Cushman Jr., “5 G.I.’s are Killed as Somalis Down 2 U.S. Helicopters,” New York Times , October 4, 1993, http://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/04/world/5-gi-s-are-killed-as-somalis-down-2-us-helicopters.html 17 M Bowden, “A Defining Battle,” Inquirer , November 16, 1997, http://inquirer.philly.com/packages/somalia/nov16/rang16.asp 18 P Collier, Medal of Honor: Portraits of Valor Beyond the Call of Duty (New York: Artisan, October 1, 2003) p. xviii 19 Bill Clinton, Address On Somalia (October 7, 1993) , in the Miller Center, accessed March 23, 2016, http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/speech-4566 . 20 F Grunewald, “Aid in a City at War: The Case of Mogadishu, Somalia,” Disasters 36 (July, 2012): S111