Channels, Fall 2016

Page 8 Dotson • The Successes and Failures of the Battle of Mogadishu Somalia’s failed state had created. Pakistani troops continued to be killed in shocking numbers as they tried to maintain peace. Soon, they too completed their own withdrawal, leaving Somalia to fend for itself. The battle also resulted in an official investigation by the Department of Defense. The investigation displaced almost all of the leadership of Task Force Ranger and placed on General Garrison, the commander of TFR, complete fault for the incident. He accepted full responsibility for the outcome of the mission and retired from the Armed Forces three years later in 1996, the day after Aidid was killed. The most significant repercussions of the battle were not the investigations or the troop withdrawals but rather the policy changes and aftereffects. One of the most important results of the battle was Presidential Decision Directive 25. Eric Heinze, in his article on U.S. foreign policy changes resulting from the incident in Somalia said, “PDD-25 was the doctrinal lynchpin [against involvement in Rwanda and Darfur]. Developed against the backdrop of the Somalia meltdown, it severely circumscribed the conditions under which the United States would participate in peacekeeping. Among other things, PDD-25 required that U.S. participation in any UN operation must ‘advance US interests.’” 21 The directive also limited U.S. participation in UN missions and support for other nations carrying out those UN-sanctioned missions. In order for the United States to engage in peace enforcement operations under the new directive, “the threat to international peace and security [must be] considered significant; US participation is necessary for… success;” and “the role of US forces [must be] tied to clear objectives and an endpoint for US participation can be identified.” 22 This directive, under these new guidelines, marked the policy restraints for non-involvement in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Darfur. The United States’ demeanor changed following the catastrophic loss of life in Mogadishu. “The punch in the nose that we got — the loss of 18 soldiers in Somalia — basically set us back on our heels as a country. It contributed to a reluctance to engage for purely humanitarian reasons where there was a reasonable risk of combat,’’ said retired Maj. Gen. Paul Eaton, who served in Somalia and on later humanitarian missions. This reluctance to engage in military action took hold of the Clinton administration almost immediately. Only a week following the battle, the USS Harlan County was ordered to withdraw from the Haitian harbor of Port-au-Prince due to a riot of fewer than two hundred lightly armed demonstrators in which there were no American injuries. 23 The fight also revealed another significant truth: Americans had still not recovered from the Vietnam complex. In an al- 21 E Heinze, “ The Rhetoric of Genocide in U.S. Foreign Policy: Rwanda and Darfur Compared ,” Political Science Quarterly 122 (Fall, 2007): p. 363. 22 Donald Daniel, “Us Perspectives On Peacekeeping: Putting PDD 25 in Context” (Naval War College Report, August 01, 1994), 2, accessed March 23, 2016, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a288845.pdf . 23 Roberto Fabricio, Key Moment For U.S. In Haiti Was In 1993, Sun Sentinel , September 18, 1994, accessed March 23, 2016, http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1994-09-18/news/9409170327_1_haitian-dock-mood .