Channels, Fall 2016

Channels • 2016 • Volume 1 • Number 1 Page 13 November 1995, the U.S.-sponsored peace talks in Dayton, Ohio resulted in the creation of a federalized Bosnia divided between a Croat-Bosniak federation and a Serb republic. The world once again questioned why the U.S. failed to intervene following the events in both Somalia and Rwanda. America continued to hesitate as Bosnia’s civil war raged on, serving only in a support capacity to the UN’s peacekeeping force that was all but powerless to stop the ethnic cleansing. America did not send ground troops to Bosnia until the end of the struggle, and even then they were kept far away from combat locations. Stars and Stripes , in an article recollecting the situation, said, “some American peacekeepers took part in the UN contingent after the Dayton peace agreement was signed, but they were in Tuzla, away from the hotter spots.” 35 The forces placed in Tuzla were used only as a token force to feign support and intervention in the conflict, all while keeping American troops out of any imperative roles or ground fighting. With this tactic, it would be easy to withdraw troops in the event of a bogged down conflict like what was experienced in Somalia. For the troops that were left as the token force, the Rules of Engagement (ROE) were even altered following the debacle in Somalia. Lieutenant General Michael Rose, the former commander of the UN force in Bosnia, remarked, “peacekeepers under fire from or taken prisoner by Serb forces over the last two years [post-Somalia] were expected to turn the other cheek for fear of ‘crossing the Mogadishu line.’” 36 Even when the United States attempted to take a leading role in the region, it was still without significant ground troops; air power was used to dominate the enemy forces, a tactic the United States has favored using in recent conflicts, such as in Syria. 37 The incident in Somalia resulted in both attitude and official policy changes that shifted the way the United States handled Bosnia. Mogadishu so significantly affected the attitude towards operations in Bosnia that a senior State Department official remarked, “Bosnia was already almost dead in terms of United States participation in peacekeeping, but Mogadishu put the last nail in the coffin.” 38 Both Congress and the Senate had constantly argued against involvement in the early months of the war prior to the Battle of Mogadishu. 35 Paul Alexander, Fallout from Somalia Still Haunts US Policy 20 Years Later, Stars and Stripes , October 03, 2013, accessed January 20, 2016, http://www.stripes.com/news/fallout-from-somalia-still-haunts-us-policy- 20-years-later-1.244957 . 36 Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, “Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 1996). 37 Dustin Walker, “Black Hawk Down: 20 Years Later,” Real Clear Defense, October 03, 2013, accessed March 23, 2016, http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2013/10/03/black_hawk_down_20_years_later_106897.ht ml . 38 Michael Gordon and Thomas Friedman, “Details of U.S. Raid in Somalia: Success so Near, a Loss so Deep,” New York Times , October 25, 1993.