Channels, Fall 2016

Channels • 2016 • Volume 1 • Number 1 Page 17 perfect blueprint for dealing with nation-building and peacekeeping operations. By 1993, however, the Battle of Mogadishu had shattered both the United Nations’ blueprint and the United States’ mold for foreign policy. Bill Clinton and his staff were quickly tasked with creating a new template for international and United Nations involvement following a political outcry. This outcry came after the United States suffered over ninety casualties and the capture of Chief Warrant Officer (WO4) Michael Durant, the pilot of one of the downed UH-60 Helicopters in Mogadishu. 45 Out of this mold came the policy that the United States has used to present day. Conclusion Post Somali incident, the American response method remained the same in all three instances. Following this atrocity, the United States administration only provided a token form of support and then largely shied away from intervention in any significant manner. In Rwanda, the token support was the 270 man contingent left there. In Bosnia, it was the troops located out of harm’s way and the air support for the UN. In Darfur, it was publically addressing the situation as genocide, contrary to the opinion of nearly every other international actor. Following the Battle of Mogadishu, America established a new rhythm when dealing with international incidents; Rwanda, Bosnia, and Darfur all fit the mold perfectly. Even without documentation linking President Bush’s inaction in Darfur to events in Somalia, this was clearly the result of the firmly established foreign policy change in 1993, from which the United States has yet to stray. While many would argue that non- intervention in Darfur was a result of the American military already being spread thin in both Iraq and Afghanistan, 46 President Bush himself argued that non-intervention in Darfur was a result of lessons learned in Rwanda, which in turn was affected directly by events in Somalia. 47 The policy change resulting from PDD-25 had become firmly ingrained in the American political decision making process. As the United States continues to face foreign policy decisions in locations such as Libya, Syria, and ISIS-controlled Iraq, the global community will watch to see if the United States 45 J Cushman Jr., “5 G.I.’s are Killed as Somalis Down 2 U.S. Helicopters,” New York Times , October 4, 1993, http://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/04/world/5-gi-s-are-killed-as-somalis-down-2-us-helicopters.html 46 Sohan Japa, “Crisis in Darfur: A Framework for Assessing the Possibility of US intervention” (diss., Standford), accessed March 23, 2016, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0ahUKEwilpqmtldjLAhUGsI MKHSyLBUoQFggcMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fweb.stanford.edu%2Fclass%2Fe297a%2FCrisis%2520in%2 520Darfur%2520-%2520A%2520Framework%2520for%2520Assess . 47 Satyam Khanna, “Bush: 'Outside forces tend to divide people up.',” Think Progress, February 20, 2008, accessed March 23, 2016, http://thinkprogress.org/politics/2008/02/20/19695/bush-outside-forces-tend- to-divide-people-up/ .