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Page 4 Little • Emotions and the Divine Nature that this is a good description of the thinkers focused on in this article. They are perfectly willing to make claims that run counter to the prevailing philosophies of the day. Irenaeus’ embrace of creation ex nihilo is a particularly striking example of this willingness to contradict Greek philosophy, as contemporary Platonism believed that the world had been formed from pre-existent matter. 16 In particular, the theory that divine impassibility is a simple importation from Hellenism ignores the fact that Hellenistic thought held a wide variety of views on the emotional state of the divine being (or beings). Gavrilyuk demonstrates this by documenting the views of several schools on emotions, the divine nature, and divine involvement in the world. 17 The Epicureans espoused the corporeal, anthropomorphic Homeric gods but insisted that they were not involved in the affairs of men. They had some emotions, such as joyfulness, but “their existence had no bearing whatsoever upon the world.” 18 The Stoics had a more complex view of God. On the one hand, God was an impersonal principle akin to the element of fire and was spread throughout the cosmos. 19 On the other hand, they would often use traditional piety and speak of the providence and care of God. 20 Finally, the Middle Platonists 21 held that the world of ideas, and therefore the divine being, was impassible. However, even this is not as clear-cut as it appears on first glance. While this view was held partially because of the belief that the passions are tied to the material realm rather than the intellectual realm, other factors were in play here as well. 22 Furthermore, much of the development of the Platonic view of impassibility occurs in Neoplatonism through the work of Plotinus, who was later than the thinkers considered in this article. 23 There was also a multiplicity of views on the validity of emotions in general. We have already noted the diversity within the Stoic view of emotions, and the Peripatetics had a more clearly positive view that simply called for moderation of the emotions. 24 There is simply no single Hellenistic view of the divine nature or even of the validity of emotions. The many views of emotions and the divine nature within Greek thought, as well as the variety of motivations for such descriptions of God, force us to recognize that the fathers were working within a complex intellectual milieu and to mitigate the claim that they 16 Irenaeus, Against Heresies, 2,10, 4. 17 The second chapter of his book The Suffering of the Impassible God is incredibly valuable on this question. 18 Gavrilyuk, The Suffering of the Impassible God, 25. 19 Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Volume I , 387-389. 20 Gavrilyuk, The Suffering of the Impassible God, 29-31. Cosmo-theology, 537, 544. 21 Examining the Middle Platonists as a school is probably more appropriate than examining Plato’s own texts; both Athenagoras and Justin seem to be interacting more with Middle Platonism than directly with Plato. In regards to Athenagoras, see Rankin, Athenagoras, 50-71. In regards to Justin, see Barnard, Justin Martyr, 27-39. Goodenough, also addresses this, albeit less clearly and somewhat indirectly in The Theology of Justin Martyr, 61-72. 22 Gavrilyuk, The Suffering of the Impassible God, 32. It is important to note that this view addressed human souls and not merely the divine nature. Thus, in this sense impassibility is not so much the result of trying to uphold an impersonal God but a result of considering what attributes are appropriate to ascribe to a non- corporeal entity. Gavrilyuk further asserts that Plotinus makes this distinction in order to guard against the evil passions ascribed of the divine being by various forms of Gnosticism. 23 For example, Gavrilyuk’s discussion of Platonism in regards to impassibility discusses Plotinus in far more detail than any other Platonic philosopher. See Gavrilyuk, The Suffering of the Impassible God, 31-33. 24 Gavrilyuk, The Suffering of the Impassible God, 26-27. This is in contrast to the Stoic view, which we have already seen is more nuanced than simply a negative rejection of all emotions.