Channels, Fall 2017

Channels • 2017 • Volume 2 • Number 1 Page 59 suggested changes to the system and how they would affect this area of law, for better or for worse. The challenges of this jurisprudence have varied throughout its many landmark changes, and today it faces a need for increased guidance for lower courts, a renewed focus on constitutional rights articulation, and a notice-based standard for particularity. Legal Background The legal ability to sue police officers in federal court comes from the 1871 Federal Civil Rights Act, known also as the Ku Klux Klan Act. Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (as it is now codified) provides for a private cause of action for those who had been constitutionally wronged by those with actual or perceived legal authority. 9 This was intended to supersede faulty and deficient state laws and provide remedies for constitutional violations, especially in areas where the Ku Klux Klan violated basic rights with no repercussions. 10 Before the 1960s, however, this law did not provide a remedy for those who suffered violations of their constitutional rights due to officers’ illegal conduct. Circuit courts interpreted § 1983 as applying only to state-sanctioned discrimination rather than applying to abuses of power in general, which greatly limited its application as a remedy for constitutional violations. 11 To this effect, the Seventh Circuit held, “The 14th Amendment does not empower Congress to... legislate against the wrongs and personal actions of individuals within the State... the Federal Civil Rights Act was never designed nor intended to redress the breach by a trustee of his equitable duties to the trust beneficiaries.” 12 Later, the same court stated, “The Civil Rights Acts do not create a cause of action for false imprisonment unless such imprisonment is in pursuance of a systematic policy of discrimination against a class or group of persons.” 13 Other cases ruled similarly and went unaddressed by the Supreme Court. 14 9 42 U.S.C. § 1983 reads, in relevant part: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress...” It is also known under the citations “R.S. 1979” and “§ 1 of the Ku Klux Act of April 20, 1871.” 10 Monroe v. Pape , 365 US 167, 173-74 (1961). 11 Stift v. Lynch, 267 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1959), citing Eaton v. Bibb, 217 F. 2d 446 (7th Cir. 1954), and Miles v. Armstrong, 207 F. 2d 284 (7th Cir. 1953). Referenced by Joseph v. Rowlen, 402 F.2d 367, 369 (7th Cir. 1968). 12 Siegel v. Ragen, 180 F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied 339 U.S. 990 (1950), 70 S.Ct. 1015, 94 L.Ed. (Cites In re Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 3 S.Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed. 835.) 13 Truitt v. State of Illinois, 278 F.2d 819, 820 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 866, 81 S.Ct. 109, 5 L. Ed. 2d 88 (1960). 14 Atterbury v. Ragen, 237 F. 2d 953, 956 (7th Cir. 1956), ), certiorari denied 353 U.S. 964, 77 S.Ct. 1049, 1 L.Ed.2d 914: “In either case, it is clear that the alleged tortious conduct of defendants was and is contrary to the laws of Illinois. In our view, such charges of aggression by state prison officials and guards, in spite of the general assertion that they were acting under color of state law, do not state a claim upon which relief can be granted under the federal Civil Rights Act.” Citing Ortega v. Ragen, 7 Cir., 216 F.2d 561, cert. denied 349 U.S. 940, 75 S.Ct. 786, 99 L.Ed. 1268; and Jennings v. Nester, 7 Cir., 217 F.2d 153, certiorari denied 349 U.S. 958, 75 S.Ct. 888, 99 L.Ed. 1281.