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Page 60 Minich • The Right Balance: Qualified Immunity and Section 1983 Monroe Era However, in the 1961 case Monroe v. Pape , the Court reversed directions and concluded that a proper interpretation of acting “under color of” law included abuse of power. 15 They derived this interpretation in part from the comments in Ex parte Virgini a concerning the Act of March 3, 1879 (20 Stat. 354) and in part from the United States v. Classic interpretation of “under color of any law” in 18 U.S.C. § 242 (then 18 U.S.C. § 52), which was later upheld in Screws v. United States . 16 Together, these rulings led the Court to hold that § 1983 applied to any misuse of state power, regardless of whether or not it is state- sanctioned. The Court also noted that, unlike the criminal code in Screws , § 1983 should be “read against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions.” 17 This made § 1983 a much more powerful tool for enforcing constitutional rights and keeping government officials accountable. However, such an interpretation of the statute would lead to many difficult questions concerning how to apply § 1983, which the Court turned to next. Following Monroe , the Court refined common-law immunities in § 1983 litigation. In the 1967 case Pierson v. Ray , the Court established, based on congressional intent, analogous precedent, and tort law principles, that common-law defenses available to officers before the institution of § 1983 (such as good faith and probable cause) remained as a “limited privilege” for officers in § 1983 lawsuits. 18 These immunities are important for protecting officers from legal “intimidation” while they exercise the discretion necessary to complete their work. 19 The Court wrote, “A policeman's lot is not so unhappy that he must choose between being charged with dereliction of duty if he does not arrest when he has probable cause, and being mulcted in damages if he does.” 20 The Court reiterated this view of “good faith, reasonable grounds” 21 immunity in Scheuer v. Rhodes (1974), where it stated, “It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the course of official conduct.” 22 Scheuer also noted the “injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith” of holding an official liable for a discretionary decision that his position required him to make, as well as the troubling 15 Monroe v. Pape. 16 Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1880) (“Whoever, by virtue of public position under a State government, deprives another of property, life, or liberty, without due process of law, or denies or takes away the equal protection of the laws, violates the constitutional inhibition; and as he acts in the name and for the State, and is clothed with the State's power, his act is that of the State.”); United States v. Classic, 313 US 299, 326 (1941) (“Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken "under color of" state law.”); Screws v. United States, 325 US 91, 112-113 (1945). 17 Monroe at 187. 18 Pierson v. Ray, 386 US 547, 554-55 (1967); citing Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951) (immunity for legislators) and Ward v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 179 F. 2d 327 (C. A. 8th Cir. 1950) (good faith and probable cause immunity for arresting innocents). 19 Pierson v. Ray at 386. 20 Ibid., 554-555. 21 Butz v. Economou, 438 US 478, 485 (1978) (Description of Scheuer and Wood). 22 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 US 232, 247-48 (1974).