Channels, Fall 2017

Channels • 2017 • Volume 2 • Number 1 Page 61 prospect of causing officials to shy away from their duties because of the threat of liability. 23 Qualified immunity became the leading question of § 1983 litigation against police officers. However, these two work against one another, as § 1983 remediates constitutionally wronged citizens, and qualified immunity protects officers from these lawsuits. Accordingly, Court’s opinion in Scheuer emphasized the importance of balance— maintaining both the remedial intent of § 1983 and “the need to protect officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official authority.” 24 The case Butz v. Economou later addressed this balance, noting that, despite the need to protect officials, “it is not unfair to hold liable the official who knows or should know he is acting outside the law, and that insisting on an awareness of clearly established constitutional limits will not unduly interfere with the exercise of official judgment.” 25 With qualified immunity so well-grounded in case law, along with policy and practical justifications for it, Wood v. Strickland established a test for applying qualified immunity, articulating two prongs: objective analysis of law and subjective analysis of good faith. 26 Under the objective test, the court looked at whether the officer “knew or reasonably should have known” that his actions would violate a constitutional right. 27 In other words, it looked at the status of the law. Under the subjective test, the court looked at whether or not the officer acted with “malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury.” 28 In other words, it looked at the officer’s motivations. Under this test, qualified immunity is denied if the official displayed “such disregard of... clearly established constitutional rights that his action cannot reasonably be characterized as being in good faith.” 29 In 1978, Procunier v. Navarette reinforced these terms and concepts, reiterating that a “clearly established” right is one which we would expect the official in question to know. 30 This test carried the clear benefit of looking at the holistic picture of the officer’s action and targeting the types of malice that created the need for § 1983 remedies in the first place. However, later courts found that the subjective prong of the test could call for virtually infinite amounts of evidence as the courts searched for indications of motives and desires. 31 Such an extensive evidence-collecting process conflicted directly with the purpose of qualified immunity recognized in Butz v. Economou and Scheuer , that of finding quick resolution to frivolous cases and affecting minimal intrusion into an officer’s 23 Ibid., 240. 24 Ibid., 504-506. Also addressed in Davis v. Scherer, 468 US 183, 195 (1984): “the balance that our cases strike between the interests in vindication of citizens' constitutional rights and in public officials' effective performance of their duties. The qualified immunity doctrine recognizes that officials can act without fear of harassing litigation only if they reasonably can anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for damages and only if unjustified lawsuits are quickly terminated.” 25 Butz v. Economou at 506-507. 26 Wood v. Strickland, 420 US 308, 321 (1975). 27 Ibid., 322. 28 Ibid., 322. 29 Ibid., 322. 30 Procunier v. Navarette, 434 US 555, 562 (1978). 31 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 US 800, 814-817 (1982).