Channels, Fall 2018

Channels • 2018 • Volume 3 • Number 1 Page 113 agenda in creating international awareness of the environmental hazards of energy development in the Arctic has negatively impacted Russia’s overall voice on environmental safety and instead emphasized its desire for Arctic development. In 2006 and 2008, Russian environmental agencies issued investigations against Royal Dutch Shell and BP, respectively. Although revealing some public concern for environmental protection, Kramer attributes the investigations as means of political pressuring. After such allegations, Royal Dutch Shell sold its claim to the Sakhalin Island natural gas and oil development to Gazprom. Following Gazprom’s purchase, all environmental investigations and charges were dropped. In the case of BP, the environmental investigation came immediately after a BP employee was arrested for industrial espionage (Kramer, 2008). Gazprom has expanded its operations internationally, purchasing oil shares for offshore drilling in Cuba in 2010. Kramer notes several environmental concerns with such a move, including the fact that it was beyond the reach of US safety regulators, there was a lack of experience of Russian off-shore oil drilling, and there was also a lack of clean-up and containment equipment available in case of a well blowout or oil spill (Kramer, 2010). Gazprom has had very close connections with the Russian government since its conception as the national gas company. In 2008, Gazprom’s chairman, Dmitri Medvedev, was selected by Putin as the next president. Kramer (2008) notes that: When Mr. Putin was still president, he used Gazprom’s wealth and economic might to fight political enemies inside Russia, to reassert influence over former Soviet republics, to gain leverage over Western European countries by increasing their dependence on Russian gas, and to wrest Russian energy assets back from foreign companies (para. 10). During the month of January, 2009, Gazprom ceased its exports of natural gas to Europe over disputes with Ukraine. Putin was heavily involved with the escalation of the crisis by taking a hard line against Ukraine (Kramer, 2009). In 2012, the EU also opened an antitrust investigation against Gazprom for unfair pricing towards differing regional blocs, favoring former USSR states (Vinocur, 2012). Furthermore, critics, such as Richard Moncrief, accuse Gazprom of using the government to keep its strong international energy standing. Moncrief claims he is the rightful owner of 40% the Yuzhno-Russkoye field, to which Gazprom dismisses his claims and contract. The Russian government has also been actively involved with meeting foreign-owned energy companies during periods of negotiations, as in the case of the Kovykta gas field. Often times the government’s agenda is beneficial to Gazprom’s commercial growth, such as increasing gas prices on nearby democratic neighbors with underlying foreign policy objectives (Kramer, 2008). Yet since 2014, Gazprom’s dominance in Europe has slowly lessened as European sanctions 4 have limited the export of technology to develop new oil fields and cheaper gas prices. Stanley Reed concludes Gazprom is slowly losing its influence and strong market in Europe. Yet at the 4 COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 960/2014 placed “restrictions on the sale, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, of certain technologies for the oil industry in Russia in the form of a prior authorisation requirement… In addition, the provision of services for deep water oil exploration and production, arctic oil exploration and production or shale oil projects should be prohibited.”