Channels, Fall 2018

Channels • 2018 • Volume 3 • Number 1 Page 21 referring to a co-reference. This may happen explicitly, as in naming a child, or implicitly, and it allows for both an individual to be referred to with multiple names as well as one name to refer to any number of individuals. Additionally, though names are attached to people and not roles, the way names are used in utterances is related to roles as names link the roles contained in utterances (Korta & Perry, 2011). Speech Acts in Scripture The majority of study relating speech act theory and Scripture consists of analyzing and/or justifying the application of speech act theory as a hermeneutical approach. However interesting, this is not the focus of my research. Instead, I seek to study speech acts as recorded in Scripture. Though scholars don’t give as much attention to this, there is still a precedent for identifying and analyzing speech acts found in biblical texts. A few noteworthy studies include Mann’s (2013) book and his later (2017) article as well as Arcadi’s (2013) article, whose study I use as a model for some of my own. Also important to note is that there are various instances recorded of God performing speech acts, either himself or through another means. While a number of philosophers and theologians have given the matter thought, Wolterstorff (1995) presents a more comprehensive analysis. He recognizes that speech acts cannot be performed through revealing but makes the case that God speaks and therefore can perform speech acts. He distinguishes between speaking and revealing. Wolterstorff claims that a person cannot perform acts through revealing, but only through speech. On the other side, “asserting, commanding, promising, and asking do not consist in the transmission of knowledge” (p. 33), but revealing does, wich distinguishes it from speaking. He also presents the idea of double agency to help the reader understand just how God might speak, rather than reveal, if he does not have the vocal mechanisms or writing capabilities to produce an utterance. Some helpful imagery here is the idea of a deputy or a secretary. As speech acts require some form of obligation, the question is raised whether God can be obligated. However, Wolterstorff finds “no reason to conclude that God cannot have the rights and duties… necessary for participating fully in the community of discoursers” (p. 112). Historical and Cultural Factors Many authors quickly point out the differences in the significance of names and naming across cultures. Wilson (2017) and Bardis (1972) acknowledge the casual stance taken by the modern Western world, contrasted with other ancient and modern cultures who put more weight on names. In his article, Schneider (2009) takes a philosophical look into these differences by dividing them into two main positions: the anthroponomastic realist and the nominalist. He writes that “names are viewed… in mutually contradictory ways: a name can either carry… the freight of one’s unique identity, or it can be seen as contingent, accidental, fundamentally meaningless” (para. 2). The first position is that of the anthroponomastic realist, which would include Judeo-Christian peoples, who believe that names are significant and “arise from and reflect essential being” (Schneider, 2009, para. 10). The second position is that of the nominalist where one believes that “names are nothing more than arbitrary labels” (Schneider, 2009, para. 9), which leades to ultimate self-determination (Schneider, 2009).