Channels, Fall 2018

Channels • 2018 • Volume 3 • Number 1 Page 43 It is clear through his writing that Maldonado is convinced that the Colombian peace process handled the issue of victims’ rights well. However, it remains to be seen whether this can transition from the theoretical to the practical. Maldonado was a part of the process, so he does not have an objective view. Colombia has already started to experience the difficulty in implementing a peace deal. Recently, FARC experienced serious backlashes in their attempts to run for government in the 2018 election. According to the peace deal, they are guaranteed ten seats in parliament if they campaign for the seats. However, when the former head of FARC, Timochenko, attempted to run for president, he was forced to withdraw his bid due to numerous death threats, as well as his ill health. While on the campaign trail he was pelted with eggs and tomatoes. This reaction by the Colombian people could show that Colombians are not entirely satisfied with the peace deal and are not ready for FARC to become a legitimate political party. Many Colombians believe that the peace deal was too soft on FARC. (“Colombia's Farc suspends election campaigning over 'threats' to candidates” 2018). The trouble that FARC met in campaigning for government is most likely just the beginning of the difficulty that Colombia will have in implementing their peace deal. Like the Northern Irish Peace Process, Colombia also utilized third-party actors. In his article Maldonado discusses how this worked. He is quick to say that the Colombian peace process was entirely led by Colombians; however, the international community did play an important role. This fact is well illustrated in Maldonado’s article. For one, he notes that Cuba hosted the talks. Additionally, the United States, the Union of South American Nations, the European Union, Germany, the Vatican, and the United Nations all sent envoys to the peace process, and Colombia also utilized international advisers. Both parties to the talks had access to an advisory team of international experts who contributed their knowledge of other peace processes. As such, they were able to help both sides work through difficulties using lessons that had been learned in other peace processes. Finally, Colombia also utilized guarantors and observing countries. The guarantors, Norway and Cuba, ensured that both sides followed the rules agreed to in the framework (Maldonado, 2017). Both Norway and Cuba had become guarantors because they were committed to the Colombian peace process. Norway especially provided much of the financial support that was needed in order for the peace process to be successful (“Norway's peace and reconciliation efforts to be stepped up,” 2018). Herding Cats discussed the two paradigms when it comes to third-party mediators, and the Colombian peace process would seem to largely adhere to the social-psychological paradigm. The third-party actors were observers: their role was simply to facilitate the peace process, not to lead the two parties through the process. At first glance, the Colombian peace process and the Northern Ireland peace process do not seem to have much in common. However, as case studies, they make an excellent comparison. Both countries experienced extended periods of violence, and had active paramilitary groups. The differences are interesting to note as well. Northern Ireland was a developed country, whereas Colombia is developing. The Northern Irish Peace Process was between two legitimate governments, whereas the Colombian peace process was between