Channels, Fall 2018

Channels • 2018 • Volume 3 • Number 1 Page 61 Before Vietnam: Understanding the Initial Stages of U.S. Involvement in Southeast Asia, 1945-1949 Jacob Mach History and Government Introduction he Vietnam War, widely considered the worst foreign policy debacle in American history, remains the most controversial event of the twentieth century. Much criticism for Vietnam involvement stems from two sources: 1) disapproval with how American leadership conducted the war, and 2) disagreement over the reason for the conflict in the first place. Few historians, if any, dispute the first criticism. The historical community remains divided, however, in terms of a definitive position on the basis or origin for the conflict. For a holistic approach to the origin of the Vietnam War, one must first elucidate the conception of American intervention in the region, including “why” and “how” it arose. Any analysis of American involvement in Vietnam must begin with President Truman and his administration following the conclusion of the Second World War. Only when viewed in the context of US foreign policy during the Cold War can this be accomplished. America’s initial involvement in Southeast Asia in the context of the developing Cold War must be thoroughly examined to more fully understand the origins of the Vietnam War. The traditional view posited by historians such as Alonzo Hamby and David McCullough praises Truman for his character and resilience in facing an extraordinary foreign policy landscape. Truman met the unprecedented challenges brought on by the rise of the Soviet Union and communism head on and without compromise. Although Hamby criticizes some of Truman’s decision making (notably his decision to drop the atomic bomb), he ultimately concludes that such decisions were justifiable given the extreme circumstances. Revisionist historians of the Truman Presidency, including Arnold Offner, criticize Truman’s underlying assumptions of the superiority of democracy and of the United States. Additionally, Offner criticizes the confrontational style of Truman, arguing that had he remained open to working with the USSR and China, tensions could have been severely decreased. Because of these assumptions, the US’s foreign policy toward Vietnam was doomed for failure, resulting in an unwinnable war. These historians simply believe that the US should never have been involved in the first place. While there are various interpretations of the foreign policy decisions of the Truman administration, these two interpretations contrast sharply. Truman either made consistent and reasonable foreign policy decisions or he made foolish and unfounded decisions. T