Channels, Fall 2018

Channels • 2018 • Volume 3 • Number 1 Page 63 entertained the idea of pushing the French to place the colony into an international trusteeship after the war, he decided to curb his criticism of colonialism for the sake of the Allied war effort. In January 1945, Roosevelt declared a prohibition on US involvement in French Indochina until the end of the war (this included helping the French rid the country of the Japanese). Roosevelt would not live to see the end of the war, but his hardline personal views on colonialism created a lasting tension between the Allies. Both Britain and France were irritated by FDR’s stance, and Truman needed to restore the relationship with his closest, most important allies. This was the atmosphere with the death of Roosevelt. Thankfully for the Allied leaders, Truman did not maintain the harsh stance of his predecessor. The Western Allied countries received their colonial holdings after the war with little trouble, but the uneasy situation in Southeast Asia would only grow in the coming decade. As a result of the tenuous relationship with his closest allies, Truman took a step back from the hardline rhetoric of his predecessor to assure the Allies of their continued control in Southeast Asia. In fact, American policy toward both Indochina and Southeast Asia was marked by a certain “ambivalence.” No distinct policy directed what transpired in the region. Instead, Truman opted for a “hands off” approach. He and his administration desired to stay “neutral” in Southeast Asia, not fully supporting the independence movements in the region or their Western Allies. That is, until an official policy toward Indochina surfaced in 1947. Their neutrality, however, generally favored their European allies and help to restore the relationships damaged by the Roosevelt Administration. The ultimate cause for such ambivalence in Southeast Asia stemmed from the emergence of the Soviet Union. Although Joseph Stalin, leader of the USSR, promised free and open elections throughout Eastern Europe, he immediately used his power to support, or in some cases, place Communist-leaning leaders such as Bulgaria and Romania in control of governments in Eastern European nations. Churchill foresaw the impending clash between the two political systems as early as March 1946 when he gave his famous “Iron Curtain” Speech. Truman slowly realized that Europe needed his full attention, and Southeast Asia soon faded as the Soviet Union rose to the forefront of US foreign policy concerns. The single most important document in the evolving situation between the US and the Soviet Union was George Kennan’s “Long Telegram,” sent to Secretary of State James Byrnes in February 1946. George Kennan proved influential in many foreign policy decisions of the early post-war years, and his “Long Telegram” was no exception. Kennan believed the USSR existed in a state of antagonism toward Western capitalist nations, referencing a statement made by Stalin the First American Trade Union Delegation in 1927. It argued that a battle between the socialist center (Moscow) and the capitalist center of the world (United States) would “decide the fate of capitalism and of communism in the entire world." Thus, Kennan deduced Soviet policy toward the West, and the United States would serve to ensure the success of the socialist center and debilitate the capitalist center. Not only would it seek to weaken the West as a whole, but they would also, Kennan warned, seek to increase divisions between capitalist Allies. This included leveraging non- communist political leaders against capitalist nations. In light of those goals, he warned that the USSR and US would not coexist peacefully, nor did he think Soviet officials believed such potential existed. He cautioned the US government not to take the circumstances