Channels, Fall 2018

Channels • 2018 • Volume 3 • Number 1 Page 67 In Malaya, British officials continued to monitor both the Soviet Union and Communist elements of China for any possible influence there. The situation in Indochina/Vietnam worried the British. While they knew independence would inevitably come for Malaya, officials were concerned about the potential Communist influence. In turn, the British slowed their approach to independence due to the economic importance of the colony and the Communist threat to the region. Britain desperately needed the production power of Malaya to emerge from its dilapidated economic state, but a prolonged colonialism could create more unrest. Malaya provided the British with precious quantities of rubber and tin, creating industries that the British could not afford to lose. Officials understood the Malayan people wanted more independence, and like what was occurring in French Indochina, a refusal could drive nationalist groups to Communism. In response, Britain relinquished power to the Malayans. They gave them a new constitution in 1948 while reiterating that full independence would not come “until the communist insurrection had been liquidated.” Malaya continued to play an important part in post-war Britain for the next decade. The United States held no colonies in Southeast Asia but, after defeating Japan, they inherited an equally demanding and delicate process: the rehabilitation of Japan. In many ways, Japan would determine the success or failure of the Allies in Southeast Asia. The United States fought the Japanese with little assistance from her other Allies, giving US officials the directive in the post-war policy toward Japan. Almost immediately, US officials developed a plan for its post-war activities in Japan. Two significant objectives defined their efforts in Japan: 1) purging Japanese nationalists who led the country into war, and 2) creating an anti-communist state driven by capitalism. The United States faced demilitarization as its first obstacle in Japan. After the purging of nearly 200,000 ultranationalists from public service, the US focused on bringing democracy to Japan, the only true method of demilitarization in the minds of many US officials. Such extreme purges, however, created an unstable political landscape in Japan, leaving the nation with few experienced politicians. George Atcheson served as the political advisor to Japan in 1946 and wrote a confidential report to President Truman about the developing political situation in Japan. Four main political parties arose during the “democratization phase” following the major purges. The Japanese quickly developed Progressive, Liberal, Social Democrat, and Communist Parties. Although the presence of a Communist party worried Atcheson to some degree, he worried more about the development of democracy in Japan. Democracy remained a young political theory in Japan, and he recognized the inseparable relationship between economics and politics at this time in Japanese history. Japan suffered greatly during the war, enduring bombings that decimated their industrial capabilities. If democracy, as introduced by the Americans, failed to quickly produce significant economic output, the Japanese may turn to other avenues for provision. Atcheson referred to those other avenues as “extremism of types we do not desire,” meaning Soviet Communism. Two other American diplomats bitterly disagreed over the Communist threat to post-war Japan. John Davies, First Secretary of the Embassy in the Soviet Union, wrote in a 1946 memorandum that the Soviet Union disapproved of American policy directives in Japan, and Soviet policy toward Japan was specifically designed to prevent the development of friendly relations between the