Channels, Fall 2018

Page 68 Mach • Before Vietnam United States and Japan. This information seemed consistent with the advice given by George Kennan concerning Soviet policy toward the US. Davies further warned, “If we (United States) withdraw from Japan without having assured ourselves of a favored position there, Japan may in all probability sooner or later be captured by the Soviet Union.” Such a statement evoked a spirited reaction from fellow diplomat John K. Emmerson, Assistant Chief of the Division of Japanese Affairs. He disagreed with the assertions of Davies, arguing that the Soviet Union posed an insignificant threat to Japan. Emmerson feared an ideological battle would doom Japan. He wanted to create a Japan dominated by neither the US nor the Soviet Union. A policy based upon a non-existent Communist threat might damage that possibility. Robert Fearey of the Office of the Political Advisor in Japan held a similar belief to that of Emmerson, but still acknowledged the Communist threat. As of April 1946, the Japanese were overwhelmingly pro-American and anti-communist, Fearey stated. Such an atmosphere could change, however, if the economic situation did not soon improve in Japan. American officials realized that economic development remained crucial to the ultimate success of the rehabilitation of Japan. By 1948, Congress appropriated over $100 million for economic development in Japan. The decision was further influenced by the increasingly bleak situation in China. The Chinese Civil War officially commenced in 1927, but hostilities remained checked throughout the Second World War because of the Japanese occupation of China. The civil war pitted government forces under the control of Chang Kai-Shek (Kuomintang) against the Communist forces of Mao Zedong (Communist Party of China) for control of the Chinese government. The Japanese invasion of China temporarily halted hostilities between the KMT and the CPC, focusing their attention on combatting the Japanese invaders. As soon as the war ended, however, hostilities again commenced between the two Chinese forces and continued until 1950. Stalin and Truman closely monitored the situation in China, knowing the result of the war could change the balance of power in Asia. Both leaders wanted to ensure victory for their respective allies while avoiding actual war between the two superpowers. Truman immediately faced a major issue; over 60,000 US troops remained in China to oversee the surrender of Japanese troops. Stalin did not like the idea of US troops stationed in China while the two Chinese factions engaged in active warfare. The situation left the US troops stuck in the middle, worsening the tension between the USSR and the US. Both Truman and Stalin wanted to avoid a long-term conflict in China and pressured the two sides to come to an armistice. In January 1946, the KMT and CPC agreed to allow the Communist party more power within the government, while keeping the KMT in charge for the time being. This compromise merely halted hostilities for a time and fighting soon resumed. The US monitored the evolving situation closely, concerned about the danger a Communist China presented for the region. While the Communist leader, Mao Zedong, publicly stated that his party was “independent of Moscow,” the Truman administration viewed these assertions with intense skepticism due to his well-documented adherence to Marxist- Leninism. The US had little reason to believe Zedong, but it also had little evidence that he was lying. In 1945, George Kennan communicated that the Soviets were extremely