Channels, Fall 2018

Channels • 2018 • Volume 3 • Number 1 Page 69 interested in the possibility of a Communist government in China and would do what it could to ensure its success. A Communist China would drastically change the balance of power in Asia, including Southeast Asia. The US confronted a progressively desperate situation. As the war in China swung in favor of the Communist forces in 1948-49, US leaders grew increasingly concerned. The US assumed a Communist China would operate in the same way the Soviet Union did, concentrating their power to expand Communism in their immediate vicinity. Soviet support for Communist China remained strong, leaving US officials no choice but to connect the USSR and the CPC. In addition, the Plans and Operations division notified Truman that a communist China would result in Communist influence in Indochina. As 1949 wore on, the CPC gained firm control of China. Truman faced a monumental decision, one that would impact US-Chinese relations for decades. The US was in a quandary. It could recognize the Communist government and seek to somehow build a relationship with a potentially antagonistic nation or refuse to legitimize the CPC and treat it as an outgrowth of the Soviet Union. The US government was divided about China, unlike the application of the Truman Doctrine in Europe which garnered significant support from all sides. The context of the decision on Communist China, however, was very different. Dean Acheson and other officials stood in favor of recognizing the Communist government in China, hoping such a recognition would encourage a split between the Soviets and China, or at the very least form a rift. The United States was at a point of heightened concern about communism, due in large part to the efforts of Joseph McCarthy. Truman did not want to go against popular opinion or appear weak against a legitimate communist threat to the security of the US and its Allies. He believed there was too much at stake both domestically and internationally to acknowledge the CPC. Even while the British recognized the CPC and pushed the Americans to do the same, they tempered their rebuke, knowing the necessity of American support moving forward. Truman and his administration focused on reorienting their foreign policy approach in light of the Communist takeover of China. The Chinese had long been a “benign” friend to the US. After its fall to Communism, the US no longer had any relationship with China. The US desperately needed a friendly nation in Southeast Asia to supplement the loss suffered in China. The Truman administration wanted to create a “collective security” in the region, combining economic and military assistance, in essence, to apply the Truman Doctrine in Southeast Asia. Japan stood as the only hope for the US in Asia. Japan remained the only nation who could become a democratic stronghold that the rest of Southeast Asia could look to for support. Truman and his officials began to realize the important role Japan would play in terms containment in the region. This “collective security” would need a stable nation with a successful economy that maintained Western connections, and Japan was the only possible location. The hope was to build up Japan to be able to assist other nations in Southeast Asia economically, together warding off Communist influence. US foreign policy was firmly entrenched in preventing the spread of Communism both in Europe and Southeast Asia. Its goal was to create a Southeast Asia united against communism on its own, only utilizing Western assistance when necessary. This further development of containment-based foreign policy came in the midst of a second flourishing Communist revolution, this time in Vietnam.