Channels, Fall 2018

Channels • 2018 • Volume 3 • Number 1 Page 71 contributed less to European recovery than did the French; the US could not afford to lose valuable and essential French assistance for the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan in Europe. The US approach to Vietnam was delicate given the relationship between the US, France, and European economic recovery/communist containment. As the French worked to establish Bao Dai (former emperor under the Japanese occupation of Indochina) as the leader of the independent State of Vietnam, the US position began to take shape. Vietnam, in contrast to Indonesia, was key to stability in Southeast Asia, as well as for economic stability for France. Economically, Vietnam remained extremely valuable for a still recovering France. The colony still held $2 billion in French investments, mainly in rice and rubber, commodities it could scarcely afford to give up given its importance to the recovery of Western Europe. Politically, Vietnam became an “important link in the US defensive perimeter” against communism in Southeast Asia. This was due in large part to two assumptions made by US officials: 1) China was looking to expand its Communist influence either through arms/aid to groups like the Vietminh, or directly to Minh, and 2) the rest of Southeast Asia would be directly threatened if Vietnam fell to Communism. While theoretically the US could allow France to handle the situation on its own, potential Communist containment took precedence. Historical American disapproval for colonialism was pitted against communist containment and friendship with the most important US ally in continental Europe. In 1948, the US made its first move toward intervention in Vietnam. In August, the government assisted the French in Vietnam under the pretext of “anti-communism.” Though, some US officials balked at such an offer, given the indiscernible link between Minh and Moscow. No thoughtful official doubted Minh’s communism, however, in light of his professed Communist views and connections with the French Communist Party, the Indochinese Communist Party, the USSR, and Communist China. Some officials pleaded with Truman to listen to Minh and seek some kind of compromise between the French and the Vietminh. This was never seriously considered, however, due to Truman’s policy to not acknowledge Communist governments or work with them. Archimedes Patti, an Office of Strategic Services (OSS) agent in Vietnam, argued that had the Truman administration treated Ho better and treated him more like a nationalist and less like a communist, conflict could have been avoided. The suggestion, however, ignores the volatile nature of Southeast Asia and the risk associated with such an assumption. Also, the decision would have alienated and angered the French, hindering European recovery, which was the US government’s primary foreign policy concern in the immediate post-war years. Conclusion Eventually, the National Security Council (NSC) prompted Truman to finalize American intervention in Vietnam. The Council, created by Truman in 1947, served as the principle avenue used by the President to make foreign policy decisions. The goal of the Council was to help organize and synthesize data to present the President with all relevant information about foreign policy matters. Its goal was not to be a powerful, all-encompassing organization acting on its own prerogative. Rather, it allowed Truman (and future