Channels, Fall 2018

Page 72 Mach • Before Vietnam Presidents) to utilize all the agencies at his disposal to come to the best possible conclusions. An NSC report written in December 1949 about the situation in Southeast Asia cemented Truman’s decision for American involvement in Vietnam. The report suggested three basic objectives the US must meet in Southeast Asia: 1) develop military power in non-Communist states in Southeast Asia for security, 2) work for the gradual reduction of Soviet influence in the region, and 3) prevent “power relationships” that would challenge the security of the US (or its Allies). The first point carried the most weight in the context of Vietnam. The French offered an alternative to Ho and his communist/nationalist Vietminh in Bao Dai. Dai was the “non-Communist force” available in Vietnam. This approach allowed the US to support an alternative to a Communist organization, while supporting French wishes in the region. Additionally, the NSC suggested that the US work toward “resolving the colonial-nationalist conflict in such a way as to satisfy the fundamental demands of the nationalist movement while at the same time minimizing the strain on colonial powers who are our Western allies.” Such a plan would support both the nationalist, non-communist movement in Vietnam, and the French who were desperate to find an alternative to Ho Chi Minh. Ambassador Caffrey indicated that expressed support for the proposed Bao Dai government, though risky, would increase the likelihood of success in the long term. Failure of the government would inevitably hurt the world perception of US power, but no alternative solution existed that satisfied all foreign policy objectives stated by Truman and his advisors. Some officials, like Charles Reed, Consul to Saigon, disagreed with the potential backing of the French because he was not confident the French would maintain their commitments to the extent they claimed. Dean Acheson favored the perspective of Reed, stating that no amount of American support could amount to any success “unless it can rally the support of the people.” The world situation, however, prompted the final decision. Communist movements posed a significant threat in Czechoslovakia, and China was firmly entrenched in Communism. The US could not bear the loss of the Southeast Asia to Communism neither the loss of an essential ally in France. In February 1950, the US finally declared recognition of the Bao Dai government in Vietnam and committed to the military and economic assistance of Southeast Asia by March of that year, totaling $15 million. Acheson, not completely in favor, reasoned such a declaration would communicate “displeasure with Communist tactics” and hopefully embolden other nationalist, non- communist groups in the region. In less than five years, the US radically altered their approach to Southeast Asia. The Truman administration moved from “strict noninvolvement to unconditional support of the French” in an effort to accomplish the many foreign policy objectives set throughout Europe, Asia, and domestically. The US remained entrenched in Vietnam for the next two decades. The Truman administration came to power in a volatile time and faced an increasingly complex, multifaceted foreign policy landscape. Historians criticize Truman for his belief in American superiority and his perceived ignorance toward compromise in certain situations, specifically his treatment of Communist China. While Truman could have more seriously considered recognition of a communist China, such a decision would have alienated many Congressman and officials in the US, jeopardizing the rehabilitation of Europe and Japan in the process. McCarthyism was in full swing as 1950 dawned, creating