Channels, Fall 2019

Channels • 2019 • Volume 4 • Number 1 Page 13 for a bad appointment, but individuals could persuade the President. Senate dominance over appointments, however, could result in a strong check on bad appointments and would also be susceptible to cabals or political patronage concerns if given the sole appointment power. As the Convention pressed onward, Edmond Randolph of Virginia put forth the ‘Big State’ Plan — or ‘Virginia Plan’ — on May 29 (White, 111). Favoring population as a means for determining representation in the U.S. Congress, Randolph believed a national judiciary would be best chosen by a national legislature (White, 111). James Wilson — an ardent defender of a strong executive — detested the plan and believed “unity in the executive” would produce a better judiciary (White, 111). The motion of appointment by the national legislature was tabled. On June 13, the method for selecting the national judiciary was once again brought up and delegates — such as Madison — proposed allowing the Senate more exclusively the role of selecting the justices (White, 112). After the debate, the motion was agreed to surprisingly. However, William Paterson presented the ‘Small State’ Plan — or ‘New Jersey Plan’ — under which the people would elect the national legislature the executive. This plan also would establish a unicameral legislature where each state has equal votes (Library of Congress). However, as noted by Eric Kasper, “the judicial appointment power stayed with the Senate alone in drafts of the Constitution” from July through August (549). The central fear coming forward from some delegates on the Senate’s appointment power stemmed from the notion that “too much input into the judicial selection process would result in legislators appointing judges as a way to repay political favors” (Kasper, 569). Following these debates, Alexander Hamilton proposed that the Executive should appoint or nominate the udiciary to the Senate, which should have the right of rejecting or approving the nominee (Harris, 21). Hamilton proposed the final product essentially of the Appointments Clause. It is surprising to note that the proposal came from Hamilton, the ardent proponent of executive power. Nominating would be in the hands of the Executive; considering and approving or rejecting would be the role of the Senate; and finally, the executive would ultimately appoint the individual if he or she so desired (Harris, 21). It is interesting to note that Hamilton saw the benefits of dividing the appointment power. Luther Martin asserted that the Senate would be the “best informed of characters” to appoint to the Supreme Court and other positions given their proximity to the states (Harris, 21). Roger Sherman again advocated for the Senate’s primacy in appointment power as there would be “better security” as it would “be less easy for candidates to intrigue with [or bribe] them, than with the Executive Magistrate” (Harris, 22). On July 21, Edmond Randolph disagreed with Sherman’s accusation and stated that the Senate would be susceptible to “cabals, personal regard, and other considerations unrelated to qualifications” (Harris, 22). George Mason detested executive appointment power on July 18 as he asserted sole executive appointment would lead to more appointments from the executive’s home state (Harris, 22). These debates, though divisive in nature, afford incredible insight into the delegate’s thoughts and developments of the appointment power as it progressed throughout the Convention. The various plans developed throughout the Convention— both the Small State and Large States Plans — demonstrate the complexity behind crafting a strong Constitution that would last for the ages. But the Compromise merged both the Small State and Large State Plans together. Under the Great Compromise, the Committee of the Eleven — or the committee of eleven delegates in charge of rectifying the disagreements in the Convention — proposed the formation of the Senate which