Channels, Fall 2019

Page 16 Wilt • It Wasn’t Supposed to be Easy precautions” (No. 51). He rationalized that instituting these seemingly obstructionist and inefficient checks was necessary because “[ambition] must be made to counteract ambition” (No. 51). Madison and the Framers understood all too well that devising a system of divided powers on paper was not enough; additionally, the Framers also knew that the “fountain of authority, the people,” were not always the most trustworthy in selecting people for specific positions within the government— especially the independent judiciary (No. 51). For this reason, the Framers installed the appointment of the judiciary by the president and the Senate. The “peculiar qualifications” of the justices combined with their “permanent tenure” must not be based on an election by the people for fear of majoritarian, mob-rule-like consequences (No. 51). One of the more famous portions of the Federalist Papers appears in Federalist No. 51, in which Madison attributes human nature as the rationale for such a level of inefficiency and obstructionism. Madison wrote the following in Federalist No. 51: But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. Madison demonstrates the fallen aspect of human nature and how the sinful habits of mankind have led to the necessity to design a government in a way that would reflect those attributes. Man is naturally prideful, selfish, and seeking his own will; when given the chance, he will pursue his personal ambition and desires to their naturally conclusive ends and will use any means to accomplish them. Federalist No. 51 is the genius justification of the framework of the federal government. The Framers’ discussion continued as the Founders believed the legislature to be the most dangerous of the branches as it is “everywhere extending the sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex” (No. 48). Madison noted that history has shown the “tendency of republican governments” to aggrandize the legislature “at the expense of the other departments” (No. 49), and that it “necessarily predominates” in the republican governmental models (No. 51). Therefore, to avoid an “elective despotism” (No. 48), the Framers divided the legislature into the House and the Senate with provisions of powers enumerated or granted to each branch of the legislature. Furthermore, to craft a more distinct, bicameral legislature, the Founders rendered “different modes of election and different principles of action” (No. 51). These electoral differences and responsibilities have profound implications for even the Supreme Court confirmation process. Original Senate Election This section of the paper will seek to understand the Founders’ view of the original Senate election mode by which they established in the Constitution and how that impacted their decision for the advice and consent power. With the Senate removed a degree from the people, it can be insulated from the people’s strong passions. James Madison considered the passions of factions to be the most concerning issue within the nascent United States political sphere, and the rise of factions could lead to significantly negative implications for the government (No. 10). Elective despotism would become the norm as the passions of most individuals would only be played out against the will of the minority (No. 48). However, the Senate acts as a direct check to the people on a few levels. First, the election of the Senate by the state legislatures was chosen because the Founders