Channels, Fall 2019

Channels • 2019 • Volume 4 • Number 1 Page 19 it will lead to “a more intelligible, if not a more certain result” (No. 66). Furthermore, Hamilton rejects the notion that patronage will dominate within the dual-appointment method between the executive and legislative branches. Hamilton asserts instead that those involved in the appointment process will be interested in the “respectable and prosperous administration of affairs” of the laws enacted and will reject candidates who have “proved themselves unworthy of the confidence” by the two branches to fulfill the duties and obligations instilled in them (No. 66). In other words, Hamilton and the Federalists believed the legislature and the executive would take care in appointing an individual who was above reproach, well-qualified for the role, and faithful in discharging the duties of the judiciary. Hamilton offers insight into the process of appointment as found within the guise of the Appointments Clause. He declares that the president’s role will be to nominate and with the concurrence of the Senate appoint the individual confirmed to the office (No. 66). One can assume that Hamilton understood the appointment power to be a shared power and responsibility between the two branches. Hamilton claims there will be no “exertion of CHOICE on the part of the Senate” (No. 66). Rather, the Senate “may defeat one choice of the Executive and oblige him to make another; but they cannot themselves CHOOSE, they can only ratify or reject the choice of the President” (No. 66). Hamilton makes several assumptions for the reader. First, the choice is ultimately up to the president; he or she alone must choose to nominate an individual to the Supreme Court or other offices as they arise. Second, the Senate may “entertain a preference to some other person” (No. 66), but that does not imply that the president will subsequently nominate such an individual. Hamilton hints at the Senate’s pre-advisory role by asserting that the Senate may make it known to the president which candidates or type of candidates the Senate would find favorable to appoint to the Supreme Court. Third, the Senate’s responsibility is to either “reject or ratify” (No. 66). Surprisingly enough, Hamilton does not leave room for the Senate to forego an action on the nomination; he would rather the Senate hold a full-body vote in the least to reject or ratify the nominee. Next, if the Senate chose to reject the nomination, there would be no guarantee that the president would subsequently nominate their preferred candidate (No. 66). Hamilton implies that the Senate would inherently be an active body and could not afford to not act within the scope of its powers on a nomination, especially to the Supreme Court. However, the absence of a declaration of necessity to hold an up or down vote on nominees put forward by the president still leaves open the room for the Senate to act under the guise of its own rules and procedures. While it may be conceded that Hamilton asserts that the Senate could “feel any other complacency towards the object of an appointment than such as the appearances of merit might inspire,” Hamilton also declared that both branches would each be interested in appointing the right character (No. 66). Federalist No. 76 was written in direct response to concerns over the Appointments Clause. Hamilton states that the president would be “better fitted to analyze and estimate the peculiar qualities adapted to particular offices, than a body of men of equal or perhaps even of superior discernment” (No. 76). Hamilton indicates that the appointment powers’ nominations would be best suited under the guise of a single individual who would not be distracted by a number of different proclivities. Furthermore, an individual would be better suited to “investigate with care the qualities requisite to the stations to be filled” (No. 76) and will seek out individuals based on the pre-requisite of filling the office with the proper individual. Contrastingly, if the Senate were to nominate, the distraction and “diversity of views, feelings and interests” would unnecessarily