Channels, Fall 2019

Channels • 2019 • Volume 4 • Number 1 Page 9 accorded discretion in how it proceeds on each nomination. Schweitzer decries the inaction of the Senate as a constitutional problem (916). Schweitzer in a way confirms the constitutional obligation model in quoting Hamilton by stating that Hamilton viewed the Advice and Consent Clause as providing for a ratification or rejection plan (919-920). However, Schweitzer still argued that the Senate’s advisory role came prior to the President’s nomination, thereby following the more recommendation model approach (920). Overall, the complexity of the Appointments Clause is apparent and glaring. Especially given the recent heated Supreme Court confirmation hearings, dramatic votes, and partisan exchanges over the nominee, a clarification on the Senate’s proper role as understood by the Founders is necessary. Several scholars have presented possible ways to reform or clarify the Senate’s role within the appointment process. Denning and Carter serve as strong resources in understanding possible reforms for the Supreme Court confirmation process. However, despite the abundant amount of resources that discuss the appointment power, the lack of agreement among the various others on the Founders’ view of the Senate’s role offers a chance to provide analytical clarity. Moreover, the dearth of information regarding how the original election methods for the senators plays into their confirmation role, or how individual senators can influence the outcome of who is appointed by the President and evaluated by the Senate will be avenues for further discussion. In all, an originalist approach to the Founders’ understanding of the Senate’s role in the confirmation process for Supreme Court justices will contribute to the on-going debate over how the current U.S. Senate should act and behave during the confirmation process. Research Design Terminology Defining terms will be both pertinent and beneficial to develop a strong foundation and baseline understanding of the terms in use throughout the research process. For example, as the research process unfolds, the definitions for words such as ‘advice’ and ‘consent’ will be analyzed and scrutinized. Some individuals have tried to define these two terms based on contemporary understanding. However, the issue with this understanding dilutes the meaning of the clause in its proper context. This leads to a dysfunctional confirmation process with multiple competing viewpoints that do not consider a balanced approach to reviewing Supreme Court nominees. However, the respective context of these terms will give more substantive meaning to their usage and application, while simultaneously pointing the research to a more conclusive end on the Framers’ understanding. Law Professor Steven Calabresi defines ‘originalism’ as when “the constitutional text ought to be given the original public meaning that it would have had at the time that it became law” (Calabresi). Additionally, the original meaning of the text can be “inferred from the background legal events and public debate that gave rise to the constitutional provision” (Calabresi). Moreover, these authors view intention of the provision’s application and original understanding as independent of each other (Calabresi). David Forte, a Senior Policy Analyst at the Heritage Foundation, defines originalism as the following: “those who make, interpret, and enforce the law ought to be guided by