Channels, Spring 2018

Page 56 Beck • The Winter War toppling of the Tsar’s regime, Finland was ready to break with Russia and seized this period of Russian disorganization as an opportunity for complete independence from any superior power. 4 One of Russia’s new leaders, Vladimir Lenin, was confident that the communist revolution begun in Russia would spread to the world. For this reason, he was willing to allow people groups like the Finns to secede from Russia, sure that they would return when the proletariat gained strength and overthrew their capitalist overlords as Russia itself had done. 5 However, the inevitable revolution was not the only reason Russia behaved this way. In 1917 the fledgling Bolshevik government in Leningrad—formerly St. Petersburg—had other pressing concerns. 6 The Soviets were struggling to assert and maintain control at home as the makings of a civil war developed. 7 Furthermore, the people groups seeking independence, Finland included, had maintained close associations with Germany. 8 As Germany quickly demonstrated its willingness to materially and militarily support pro- German movements in these regions, 9 war-torn Russia was forced to allow the balkanization of its old holdings for fear of further conflict with Germany. 10 As such, the fragile new regime recognized that it did not have the practical might or political capital to resist Finnish independence, and contented itself with covertly supporting the quickly defeated communist party in Finland’s brief civil war. 11 After achieving its independence from Russia and—with German aid—quelling its civil war with the defeat of the pro-communist forces, 12 Finland solidified its global position with the Treaty of Dorpat in 1920. Negotiated between Finland and Russia, the treaty set the territorial boundary lines and detailed the mutual rights and obligations of each toward the other. 13 While the treaty was an important diplomatic step for the new nations, neither Russia nor Finland was particularly pleased with the details. The Finnish nationalists felt that Finland’s delegation had conceded more to their former overlords than it should have, 14 while Russian weakness forced them to grant Finland control of a large strip of the Karelian Isthmus near the recently-renamed Russian city of Leningrad. 15 Future Russian leaders, most notably Joseph Stalin, would find this demarcation uncomfortably close to Leningrad’s vital population centers. 16 4 Keegan, The First World War , 378. 5 Ibid, 378. 6 Loima, “A Case Study of Education and Nationalism,” 762. 7 Keegan, The First World War , 380. 8 Ibid, 378. 9 Ibid, 378. 10 Ibid, 379. 11 Ibid, 378. 12 Ibid, 380. 13 Albin T. Anderson, “Origins of the Winter War: A Study of Russo-Finnish Diplomacy,” World Politics , Vol. 6, No. 2 (1954): 169. 14 Anderson, “Origins of the Winter War,” 169. 15 Keegan, The Second World War, 47. 16 Ibid, 47.