Channels, Spring 2018

Channels • 2018 • Volume 2 • Number 2 Page 57 There are several important conclusions to draw about Finnish and Russian attitudes and perspectives from Finland’s history with Russia that impacted the development of the Winter War. Given its hundred-year control of Finland, Russia saw Finland as a part of its historic territory and hegemony, which was necessary to restore its place as an empire. Finland, given Russia’s conquest of its territory in 1809, the period of Russification by the Tsars, and Communist Russia’s interference in its civil war, saw the new Russian government in much the same light as it saw the old, as a potential aggressor to its sovereignty. 17 While these attitudes and perspectives lingered under the surface and informed the strategic choices made by both sides, the impetus for the conflict stemmed from the Treaty of Dorpat. Although both sides were initially unhappy with the borders settled upon in 1920, those attitudes had changed by 1939. The Finns, though initially displeased, had grown accustomed to the treaty and were content to retain it. 18 Russia, on the other hand, had originally viewed the treaty as a stain upon its national honor, but was content to wait on a natural remedy through time and the inevitable process of revolution. However, changing world circumstances had changed its views and Russian now considered an alteration to the Treaty of Dorpat’s terms as of vital importance to its security. By the late 1930s, German actions had shortened Russian patience for the inevitable communist revolution that was supposed to return its control of Finnish territory. Specifically, the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact and the subsequent German invasion of Poland caused considerable angst in Russia. The Nazi-Soviet Pact, which split Eastern Europe between Germany and Russia, 19 gave Russia control over the Baltic nations—including Finland. 20 The restoration of these nations would substantially allow Communist Russia to mirror the borders of its old empire under the Tsars. 21 While this agreement formed an incredible opportunity for the new communist government to assert itself as a rising world power, it also contained a potential danger should Russia fail to capitalize on it. Germany quickly took advantage of its portion of territory allotted by the agreement when it aggressively seized western Poland in 1939. If Russia failed to exert control over the areas given to it in the Pact, there was a danger that its co-signer would see Russia as weak and ripe for German invasion. The effect of the agreement, according to one scholar, was that Russia attempted to mimic Germany by “imposing [its] will on smaller powers.” 22 Attempting to follow Germany’s pattern of behavior, Russia demanded and received mutual assistance and military access 17 Anderson, “Origins of the Winter War,” 169. 18 Ibid, 173. 19 Robert M. Citino, “White Death,” World War II , Vol. 29, No. 2 (2014): 44. 20 Kimmo Rentola, “The Finnish Communists and the Winter War,” Journal of Contemporary History , Vol. 33, No. 4 (1998): 592. 21 Citino, “White Death,” 45. 22 D. W. Spring, “The Soviet Decision for War against Finland, 30 November 1939,” Soviet Studies , Vol. 38, No. 2 (1986): 221.