Channels, Spring 2018

Page 58 Beck • The Winter War treaties with Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, 23 leaving Finland as the only Baltic holdout to Russian hegemony. 24 The Nazi-Soviet Pact, then, predisposed Russia to be unwilling to accept the status quo of its interwar period relationship with Finland. 25 However, Russia was also concerned that any perception of weakness would lead to a major problem for its national security. Specifically, Russia was intensely worried that Germany, its ideological opponent, would invade Russia through Finland. 26 While any potential invasion was a matter of consternation, the close proximity of the Finnish border to the key Russian city of Leningrad essentially guaranteed the city’s capture by the German blitzkrieg. 27 Thus, Russia, due to its feelings of vulnerability and need to project strength to hide weakness, determined to win concessions from Finland, 28 ideally through diplomatic might, but military force remained an option. The need to break the status quo with Finland heightened after the Austro-German Anschluss in March of 1938. From an ideological perspective, Bolshevik Russia viewed war and expansion as the essence of Nazism. 29 Germany’s aggressive expansionism after Hitler’s rise to power only confirmed Russian concerns. Faced with Nazi Germany’s growing threat to the future of the Soviet Revolution in Western Europe, the Soviets were looking for ways to protect themselves and further their interests. Shortly thereafter, Russia opened negotiations with Finnish diplomats to strengthen its position against the potential of German aggression. 30 In exchange for a generous gift of territory in Soviet Karelia, 31 the Russians demanded the Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus be moved 70 km to the west—a mutual assistance pact against German aggression—and access to a naval base off the western coast of Finland. 32 All of these demands were calculated as defensive measures against a German invasion. The territory on the Karelian Isthmus and the space opened by moving the border would allow the Russians to create a land buffer to protect Leningrad, while the naval base would, in theory, allow the Russians to prevent a German force from landing in Finland in the first place. 33 23 Spring, “The Soviet Decision for War against Finland,” 208. 24 Peter J. Beck, “The Winter War in the International Context: Britain and the League of Nation’s Role in the Russo-Finnish Dispute, 1939-1940,” Journal of Baltic Studies , Vol. 12, No. 1 (1981): 59. 25 Spring, “The Soviet Decision for War against Finland,” 221. 26 Anderson, “Origins of the Winter War,”170-172. 27 Ibid, 172. 28 Spring, “The Soviet Decision for War against Finland,” 222. 29 Toomas Varrak, “The Secret Dossier of Finnish Marshal C.G.E. Mannerheim: On the Diplomatic Prelude of World War II,” Journal of International Affairs , Vol. 21, No. 2 (2016): 83. 30 Anderson, “Origins of the Winter War,” 169. 31 P.W. Doerr, “Frigid but Unprovocative: British Policy towards the USSR from the Nazi-Soviet Pact to the Winter War, 1939,” Journal of Contemporary History , Vol. 36, No. 3 (2001): 433. 32 Kalervo Hovi, “Finland’s Rapprochement to National-Socialist Germany as Reaction Against Winter War,” Romanian Journal for Baltic & Nordic Studies , Vol. 5, No. 1 (2013): 58. 33 Spring, “The Soviet Decision for War against Finland,” 222.