Channels, Spring 2018

Channels • 2018 • Volume 2 • Number 2 Page 59 It is worth noting that some scholars assert that Russia, given its relationship with Germany, was not legitimately concerned about a German invasion. 34 Instead, it was primarily motivated by a desire to restore the bounds of the old empire through subjugating weaker peoples, like the Finns. 35 While it is clear that Russia was looking out for its own imperial interests, 36 which doubtlessly included expansion as its behavior after the end of World War II amply demonstrates, it still had good reason to be concerned about its defensive position given Germany’s recent actions. While not as significant as the German invasion of Poland or its actions toward Austria or Czechoslovakia, one factor that worried Russian leaders and threatened to compromise its defensive position was the Anglo-German Naval Agreement. 37 The agreement allowed Germany to radically increase the size of its fleet, threatening Russian control of the Baltic Sea and its vital sea route to the Atlantic. Germany’s decision to strengthen its surface fleet, as authorized by the Anglo- German Naval Agreement, likely played a significant role in Russia’s decision to include access to a naval base in the Baltic Sea as one of its primary demands to Finland. Thus, while Russia was undoubtedly seeking to increase its area of control, it had legitimate causes of concern about German aggression through Finland or the Gulf of Finland and felt the need to appear stronger and better defended by altering its borders with Finland. 38 Regardless of Russia’s motives, size, and relative might, Finland was not interested in conceding its territory to Russia or anyone else. The years since 1917 and the deepening world crisis in 1939 had not led Finland to forget its long history under Russian domination. Its experiences, including Russian interference in Finnish politics in the interwar period, contributed to a “legacy of suspicion” toward Russian diplomatic offers, especially those in which Russia would gain control of historically Finnish territory. 39 As Russian domination of Estonia following its mutual assistance pact had proved, 40 surrendering Finnish territory or military freedom of action to their “former imperial masters” would severely threaten Finland’s sovereignty and independence. 41 Not only was Finland suspicious of Russia’s motives, it was also hesitant to enter into binding relations with any major-power bloc during this period of its history. 42 Its hesitancy was only increased by the Russians’ suggestion that Finland ought to ally itself militarily with Russia against the prospect of German aggression. Just as Finland saw Communist Russia in terms of the Tsars’ suppression of Finnish sovereignty, it still thought of Germany as the supporter of its independence movement in 1917. 43 Though National- Socialist Germany was very different from the Kaiser’s Germany, Finland still had significant economic, scholastic, cultural, and ecclesiastical ties with Germany and the 34 Varrak, “The Secret Dossier of Finnish Marshal C.G.E. Mannerheim,” 84. 35 Ibid, 85. 36 Roger Reese, “Lessons of the Winter War: A Study in the Military Effectiveness of the Red Army, 1939- 1940,” The Journal of Military History , Vol. 72, No. 3 (2008): 827. 37 Ibid, 86. 38 Spring, “The Soviet Decision for War against Finland,” 222. 39 Anderson, “Origins of the Winter War,” 169. 40 Evald Laasi, “Finland’s Winter War and Estonian Neutrality,” Journal of Baltic Studies , Vol. 24, No. 3 (1993): 269-270. 41 Citino, “White Death,” 45. 42 Anderson, “Origins of the Winter War,” 170. 43 Hovi, “Finland’s Rapprochement to National-Socialist Germany,” 58.