Channels, Spring 2018

Page 60 Beck • The Winter War German-speaking peoples. 44 Thus, despite its growing disillusionment with Nazi Germany’s expansionistic behavior, Finland was inclined to see Germany as its defender against Russia rather than the other way around. 45 Although Finland received no substantive promises of support from any of its neighbors or the western powers, it refused Russian demands time and time again throughout the off- and-on negotiations of 1939. Though the Finns ordered a partial military mobilization in response to Russian activity in Latvia and Estonia during October, it was optimistic that German interest in Finland would deter Russia from advancing its demands through force. 46 This confidence in German support prompted Finland to assert a stronger negotiating stance with Russia than its military position—or the secret details of the Nazi- Soviet Pact—would suggest was prudent. After months of unproductive diplomatic activity, Russian patience expired on November 9 th , as the negotiations ground to a halt. 47 Though Russia could have simply reinitiated negotiations at another time, failing to gain even modest concessions from its small neighbor made Russia appear weak on the world stage and lent credibility to reports of its military inability. 48 Unwilling to wait or suffer the uncertainty of the status quo, Russian forces staged a military incident on November 26 th near the Finnish border and quickly demanded that the Finns remove their troops from the region. 49 Finland again failed to comply with its demands and Russia invaded on November 30 th , 1939. 50 The Russian battle plan required the roughly twenty divisions contained in the Leningrad Military District—composed mainly of reservists—to overwhelm and destroy the Finnish defenses in only twelve days. 51 Given its timetable, the Soviets were clearly expecting their invasion of Finland to mirror Germany’s quick invasion and subjugation of Poland. 52 However, almost nothing would go according to plan for the Russian military in 1939. Russian leaders, guilty of consistently underestimating the strength of Finnish troops and defenses, 53 divided their forces into two groups. The first army group attacked straight up the Karelian Isthmus from Leningrad, while the second army group entered Finland through its long eastern flank. 54 Russian forces, though significantly superior in strength and material, were steadily defeated by the hardy Finnish resistance. 55 Russia’s divided forces were not strong enough to break through the Mannerheim Line along the Karelian 44 Ibid, 58. 45 Anderson, “Origins of the Winter War,” 171. 46 Doerr, “Frigid but Unprovocative,” 431. 47 Anderson, “Origins of the Winter War,” 184. 48 Spring, “The Soviet Decision for War against Finland,” 217. 49 Anderson, “Origins of the Winter War,” 186. 50 Keegan, The Second World War, 47. 51 Reese, “Lessons of the Winter War,” 827. 52 Citino, “White Death,” 45. 53 Roger Reese, “Surrender and Capture in the Winter War and Great Patriotic War: Which was the Anomaly?” Global War Studies , Vol. 8, No. 1 (2011): 91. 54 Keegan, The Second World War , 47. 55 Reese, “Lessons of the Winter War,” 828.