Channels, Spring 2018

Page 62 Beck • The Winter War displayed many significant weaknesses in the Russian Army. Most notable of which were its shortage of experienced commanders, its poorly-trained troops, 66 and the inefficient organization of the Commissar system. 67 However, the War also showed Russia’s military strength, albeit in an unconventional fashion. Though the Russian attack began disastrously, the army was able to regroup, overcome poor leadership, suffer enormous losses, and achieve victory over a superior foe by relentless attacks and weight of numbers. 68 In spite of all its failures, the Russian army overcame the enemy. The Germans, then, should have realized that the Russian army would not be broken by a quick campaign during the summer of 1941. Russian commanders would come and go, but, with its nearly limitless reserves, the Russian army would continue to fight until it eventually wore down its opponent. Viewed in this light, the Winter War boded ill for Hitler’s decision to kick in the Russian door with Operation Barbarossa. Russia’s decision to invade Finland in 1939 was motived by a desire to project strength and secure its border from invasion through Finland. It could be argued that it failed in both of these respects. First, in its efforts to secure its border against an invasion from Finland, it secured the animus of the Finnish people, guaranteeing that when a German invasion came, it would be accompanied by the aggrieved armies of Finland fighting to regain their territory. 69 Second, though it eventually made Finland acquiesce to its demands, Russia was not able to project strength in doing so. In fact, contrary to its intention, the Winter War convinced the world that Russia would fall easily to a first-rate army. 70 Thus, the War projected not Russian strength, but its weakness. However, its apparent weakness was what fooled Hitler into gambling his armies in a lightning attack on Moscow. Among Russia’s gains in the Winter War was the contempt of German military leadership— allowing Russia to establish an empire far beyond that of the Tsars in Eastern Europe—as it rolled back German advances along the path to Berlin in 1944. Conclusion Viewed in this light, it is clear that the Winter War—though it occurred during the curiously quiet period between Hitler’s invasion of Poland and the true beginnings of hostilities with the invasion of France—lays crucial groundwork for understanding the larger conflict and the ultimate course of World War II. Without consideration of the Winter War and its impact on Hitler’s perception of Russia’s military strength, it is difficult to understand Hitler’s decision to provoke and attack the largest military in the world. Without understanding why Stalin invaded Finland out of an intense fear of a German invasion, Stalin’s later appeasement policy toward a Germany clearly arming to invade makes little sense. 71 In addition, the Winter War explains and provides a prototype of how the Russian military could suffer such massive defeats in the summer of 1941, rearm and 66 Reese, “Surrender and Capture in the Winter War,” 98. 67 Kahn, “‘Russia Will Assuredly Be Defeated,’” 227. 68 Ibid, 852. 69 Toivonen, “War and Equality,” 473-474. 70 Kahn, “‘Russia Will Assuredly Be Defeated,’” 227. 71 Keegan, The Second World War, 180-181.