Channels, Spring 2019

Channels • 2019 • Volume 3 • Number 2 Page 23 As the war-weary British people finally began to wake up to German aggression, the politicians could slowly get in line behind Churchill. Indeed, some, such as Mr. Baldwin, had privately indicated agreement as early as 1936, but, for fear of their political futures, they were unwilling to speak truthfully before the public about the growing threat of Hitler. Though Baldwin recognized the need to deter Germany by rearming, it had come at the forceful prodding of Churchill, who continued to receive startling and classified intelligence from contacts in the Government’s Foreign Office; this time concerning the size of the German Luftwaffe.26 Nonetheless, Baldwin’s recognition was not met by the sort of immediacy and urgency that Churchill had long been awaiting. With Baldwin dragging his feet, and obvious signs that “the scale of [Britain’s] arms production was still not adequate to meet a German threat in 1937 or 1938,” Churchill somberly lambasted the state of affairs.27 Deprecating the Government’s argument that instituting a Ministry of Supply would somehow turn Britain “into one vast munitions camp,” Churchill addressed the House saying: Anyone can see what the position is. The Government simply cannot make up their minds, or they cannot get the Prime Minister to make up his mind. So they go on in strange paradox, decided only to be undecided, resolved to be irresolute, adamant for drift, solid for fluidity, all-powerful to be impotent. So we go on preparing more months and years – precious, perhaps vital to the greatness of Britain – for the locusts to eat. They will say to me, ‘A Minister of Supply is not necessary, for all is going well.’ I deny it. ‘The position is satisfactory.’ It is not true. ‘All is proceeding according to plan.’ We know what that means.28 Quite provoked by this attack, Baldwin tried to deflect Churchill’s criticism that he was furthering and, in part, responsible for “The Locust Years” of 1934 and 1935. The explanation for the delay came with what would be perhaps Baldwin’s worst moment. In an apparently unscripted moment, he admitted that, in order to win, he had waited to announce the need for rearmament until after the General Election of 1935: Supposing I had gone to the country and said that Germany was rearming and that we must rearm, does anybody think that this pacific democracy would have rallied to that cry at that moment? I cannot think of anything that would have made the loss of the election from my point of view more certain.29 This duplicity, or “squalid confession,” as Churchill later wrote, contributed to the growing perception of Baldwin as a weak and somewhat declining figure in politics.30 Combined with his Government’s very poor handling of the Abyssinia crisis – in which Mussolini had his way, the League of Nations was ignored, and Fascist Italy became emboldened to conquer Abyssinia (present-day Ethiopia) – the blunder in Parliament brought Baldwin to the lowest point in his political career, and he began looking for the right moment to leave. 31 That moment came after his successful handling of the Abdication crisis, which was met with general approval by the public. To 26 Martin Gilbert, Churchill: A Life (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1991), 560. 27 Gilbert, Churchill: A Life , 567. 28 Churchill's Speeches: “The Locust Years,” November 12, 1936, accessed March 25, 2018. http://www.churchill-society-london.org.uk/Locusts.html ; italics mine. 29 Guedalla, Mr. Churchill , 260. 30 Gilbert, Churchill: A Life , 567. 31 Ibid., 548.