Channels, Spring 2019

Channels • 2019 • Volume 3 • Number 2 Page 25 not want any more land in Europe was just another one of his schemes. His word was indeed worthless. Emboldened after having his way at Munich, Hitler began to set his eye of treachery against the ideas of the West. Sensing the potential threat Churchill and other backbenchers posed to his plans, Hitler sought to disparage them before the enactment of his policies betrayed previous promises for the lies that they were. Particularly worried about Churchill, who had called for opponents of Nazism within Germany to make their voices heard, Hitler issued an indirect attack against him when he “warned the democracies of the world of the ‘dangers’ of free speech, especially ‘freedom for war-mongering.’”37 The absurdity of the remark was exposed three days later when Hitler directed Kristallnacht, the night of widespread terrorism, destruction, and violence against the Jewish people, which resulted in hundreds of deaths and thousands more being sent to concentration camps. If there was any moment when Britons would hear the cries of Churchill for a Ministry of Supply, it had to be now. But, alas, Parliament stood in his way, and they would have none of it. Chamberlain rashly called into question Churchill’s judgment, and the motion for a Ministry of Supply was soundly defeated in the House.38 Churchill was disgusted by the result and wrote to a friend, “Chamberlain has now got away with everything. Munich is dead, the unpreparedness forgotten, and there is to be no real, earnest, new effort to arm the nation. Even the breathing space, purchased at hideous cost, is to be wasted.”39 In defiance of Britain and France’s warnings, Hitler’s Nazi Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939. When the two allies declared war a couple of days later, it did not come with an immediate military plan to confront the complicated situation in Poland. Moreover, they needed time to do what they ought to have done years before—rearm. Without Churchill’s vigorous attention and private correspondence with Government Ministers relating to the issue of Britain’s security, the fate of freedom would have been even more desperate than indeed it was. For as it stood, Britain was declaring war on a power that was close to four times its size in terms of airpower, not to mention Germany’s well-advanced strategy and highly developed military machinery. Britain’s reliance on France for infantry was fundamental to the Allies’ plan. Yet the beginning of the war would mostly revolve around the sea. Consequently, in Britain the central figure at the start was the First Lord of the Admiralty. By the clamor of the press, PM Chamberlain was forced to fill this Cabinet position with the man who should never have been relegated to the backbench in the first place.40 Churchill was appointed and given a seat in the War Cabinet on September 3, the same day on which war was declared. As the most vocal member of the Government, Churchill received even more recognition as the early war months passed with many sea encounters involving the Royal Navy. When an attempt to prevent Germany from taking Norway ended in the withdrawal of Naval and expeditionary forces, Churchill explained to a critical Parliament the reason for the disaster. There was a manifest reason why the Navy had failed to stop the German troops from crossing the sea and failed in its efforts to land equipment and reinforcements for the ground forces: “It is our failure in the last five years to maintain or regain air parity with Germany,” Churchill said, The immense enemy air strength which can be brought to bear upon our patrolling craft had made this method far too costly to be adopted . . . The intense and continuous bombing of the bases at 37 Gilbert, Churchill: A Life, 604. 38 Gilbert, Churchill: A Life , 604-5. 39 Ibid., 605. 40 Guedalla, Mr. Churchill , 274-5.